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SHOULD A HUNGER-STRIKING PRISONER
BE ALLOWED TO DIE?
The hunger-strike' has long been utilized by prisoners to gain public attention for
causes or beliefs important to thein. 2 Recently, this medium of protest was the subject of
at least three suits before stale courts. 3 In ?ant v. Prevatte, 4 Von Holden v. Chapman 5 and
State ex rel. White v. Narick," petitions were brought before state courts requesting injunc-
tions either to authorize or prevent prison officials from force-feeding' an inmate on a
hunger strike!' In each case, the prisoner asserted that his constitutional guarantees of
due process under the fourteenth amendment and of free expression under the first
amendment allowed him to refuse any intrusion upon his person. 9 The prison officials in
' A "hunger strike" in the context of this note is the "action of one, especially a prisoner, who
refuses to eat anything or enough to sustain life so as to obtain compliance with his demands."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1103 (3d ed. 1971).
2 This technique often has been used for political causes. For example, Emmeline Goulden
Pankhurst, British feminist and leader of the militant suffrage movement, staged the first of her
many hunger strikes during her imprisonment in Holloway Gaoul in 1912. 18 COLLIER'S ENCY-
CLOPEDIA 392 (1977). Pankhurst's strike brought the suffragette movement to the attention of the
public and portended the expansion of the franchise to women. Id.
Another important figure who adopted this technique was Mahatma Gandhi. See TRUTH AND
NONVIOLENCE REPORT 01."I'HE UNESCO SYMPOSIUM ON TRUTH AND NONVIOLENCE IN GANDHI'S
HUMANISM 153 (1970). Through his hunger strikes, Gandhi brought world attention to the problems
of a country attempting to emerge from the colonial era. Id. Gandhi used his hunger strikes as a
nonviolent form of protest, which eventually helped establish an independent India. Id. at 1-14.
A recent hunger striker to attract world attention was Bobby Sands of the Irish Republican
Army. See Levin & Donosky, Death With in Ulster, NEWSWEEK, May 4, 1981, at 40-41. While impris-
oned in Maze Prison near Belfast, Sands began his strike in protest of the British occupation of
Northern Ireland. Id. at 40. Sands' strike and resulting death brought international attention to the
situation in Northern Ireland. Id.
3 Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982) (petition by state prison health superin-
tendent for authority to force-feed hunger-striking prisoner to prevent prisoner's death); Von
Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982) (petition by state prison psychiatric
director for authority to force-feed prisoner who had not eaten for twenty-two days); State ex rel.
White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982) (petition by hunger-striking prisoner for injunctive
relief preventing prison officials from force-feeding him).
248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Zant]. For a discussion of Zant, see
infra notes 37-63 and accompanying text.
5 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Chapman]. For a discussion of
Chapman, see infra notes 64-90 and accompanying text.
6 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Narickl. For a discussion of Narick, see infra
notes 91-122 and accompanying text.
7 "Force-feeding" in the context of this note is the act of feeding a prisoner by forcible
administration of food. WEBSTER'S TF I I RD NEW INTERNATIONAL act I ONA RY 887 (3d ed. 1971). It can
be accomplished in several ways, including intravenously and by means of a nasal gastric tube. See
Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
Zant, 248 Ga. at 832, 286 S.E.2d at 715; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625;
Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 55.
9 Zant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman 87 A.D.2d at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624; Narick,
292 S.E.2d at 57-58. Each of the prisoners attempted to invoke his right to privacy as guaranteed by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Zant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716;
Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624; Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 57-58..The right to privacy was
violated, according to the prisoners, by each state's nonconsensual invasion of their persons by the
force-feedings. Zant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at
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each case claimed that the interests of the state outweighed the restricted constitutional
rights of the inmate.'" Despite somewhat similar analyses, the three state courts reached
different results. Two of the courts held that the state's compelling interests in the sanctity
of life" justified the state's force-feeding of the hunger-striking prisoner," while the
third court expressly found that the prisoner's substantive due process rights outweighed
any of the claimed interests of the state.'
Zant, Chapman, and Narick, the only United States decisions addressing the constitu-
tional implications of a hunger-strike," represent the exploration of a new direction in
due process and prisoners' rights.' 5 The decisions involve the difficult task of determining
exactly when and under what circumstances prison officials can compel a hunger striker
to eat. There are a munher of issues which a court faced with a hunger-strike case must
resolve. Initially, the court must determine what constitutional rights — if any — protect a
hunger striker.'s Next, the court must identify and evaluate the relevant state interests as
624; Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 57-58. Moreover, the prisoners' right to self-determination was allegedly
violated by each state's refusal to permit the hunger striker to pursue his chosen course of conduct,
Zara, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624; Narick, 292
S.E.2d at 57-58. For a discussion of this privacy right contention, see infra notes 138-89 and
accompanying text.
1 " Zant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624;
Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 56.
" For a discussion of the state's interest in the sanctity of life, see infra notes 249-87 and
accompanying text.
12 Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 71, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627; Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 58. The courts in
Chapman and Narick ruled that the state's interests outweigh the prisoner's right to privacy and thus
authorized the prison officials to force-feed the hunger strikers. Id.
" Zant, 248 Ga. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 717. The Zant court upheld the right of an inmate to
refuse force-feedings by virtue of his privacy right. Id.
" As of March I, 1984, these cases were the only United States decision round which addressed
the constitutional implications surrounding this issue. One federal case, however, Boyce v. Petrovsky,
No. 81-3322 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 1981) (available August 15, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist.
file), also involved a hunger strike. Id. Christopher John Boyce, an inmate at the United States
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, filed a petition for a writ of habeus corpus alleging that the
defendant, Warden John Petrovsky, had violated his first, fifth, sixth, and eight amendment rights by
force-feeding him against his will. Id. The court dismissed the petitioner's constitutional claims
summarily and held that the government had a constitutional obligation under the eighth amendment
to provide necessary medical treatment for those punished by incarceration. Id. The district court
ruled that "the government cannot be relieved of that constitutional obligation by the unreliable
whims of individual prisoners. Since this court would not permit a prisoner to submit willingly to
cruel or unusual punishment, it will not permit a prisoner to waive his right to receive necessary
medical treatment." Id. The Boyce decision, therefore, is more accurately read as a refusal to
recognize the prisoner's decision as a competent one. In fact, the whole issue of the prisoner's
constitutional rights was summarily dismissed by the court when it found the prisoner's decision to be
an unreliable whim. See id, Without a competent waiver of the prisoner's right to receive medical
treatment, the constitutional issues did not need to be reached. See infra notes 138-93 and accom-
panying text. Thus, the Boyce decision does not apply to the issues discussed in this note.
" There has been a perceived lack of standards involving all rights possessed by inmates of
penal institutions. See George, Standards Governing Legal Status of Prisoners, 59 DEN. L.J. 93 (1981).
The Supreme Court. has developed a general standard which provides that prisoners retain the rights
of free citizens except when restrictions are required to assure orderly confinement and the physical
safety of the inmates and the public generally. See infra notes 298-308 and accompanying text. The
hunger-strike cases, therefore, provide the first judicial attempt to define the limits on prisoners'
rights to self-determination.
" See infra notes 134-222 and accompanying text.
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they apply to the case of a hunger striker)? Finally, the courts must decide, at least
implicitly, the extent to which the inmate's status as a prisoner acts to limit his constitu-
tional rights.'"
This note will address the constitutional issues which confront courts presented with
hunger-strike cases. The first section examines the three 1 982  cases and analyzes their
methodology and use of authority.' 6  Based on this analysis, the note suggests that the
methodologies of the state courts are inadequate, the important constitutional guarantees
involved in hunger-strike cases warranting fuller analysis. 2 " This note then undertakes a
full analysis of the issue. 2 ' First, the constitutional rights of individuals — to substantive
due process under the fourteenth amendtnent22 and free expression under the first
amendment 23 — which potentially may protect a prisoner's hunger strike are discussed. 24
Second, the effect of the inmate's status as a prisoner of a penal institution on his
constitutional protections is explored." Next, the relevant. state interests are identified
and categorized. 2 " The Massachusetts case of Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz 27 is used as a guidepost to illustrate the interests of the state in the substantive
due process context." In addition, the United States Supreme. Court decision ofProcunier
v. Martinez 29 is used to illustrate the array of state's interests arising from its duty to
maintain its penal inistittttions. 3 ° Finally, the current judicial approach to alleged constitu-
tional infractions in the prison context is examined. 3 '
As with many constitutional issues, the proper resolution of a hunger-strike case
entails a careful balancing of the individual's rights against the interests of the state.32
Thus, after defining and describing the individual's rights and the state's interests, this
note undertakes the mandated balancing process.' The rights and interests will be
analyzed and balanced in the context of a prisoner who has refused to eat. 34 It is
submitted that the right to self-determination should be extended to encompass the right
to hunger strike." Moreover, an analogy to the recognized right to refuse medical
treatment will be drawn to demonstrate the impropriety of state infringement upon such
life and death decisions.36
17 See infra notes 243-318 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 223-42 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 37-133 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 125 - 33 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 134 - 479 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes t38-93 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 194 - 222 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 134-222 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 223 -42 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 243-318 and accompanying text,
" 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
" See infra notes 249.87 and accompanying text.
" 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
3° See infra notes 288-318 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 319-49 and accompanying text.
32 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (balance between individual's right to
self-determination and states interest in preservation of life); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965) (balance between individual's right to privacy and state's interest in promoting public
welfare).'
33 See infra notes 350-479 and accompanying text.
3 ' See infra notes 350-479 and accompanying text.
3 ' See infra notes 480-99 and accompanying text.
38
 See infra notes 485-500 and accompanying text.
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1. THE HUNGER STRIKE CASES
In Zant v. Prevatte;" the Supreme Court of Georgia considered a petition from the
Superintendent of the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center seeking authorization
to force-feed a hunger-striking prisoner 3 8 Ted Anthony Prevatte had been on a hunger
strike for twenty-three days when he refused to allow prison doctors to examine. him. 39
The prison doctors felt that Prevatte was in ketosis" and that his life was in danger."
Prevatte's hunger strike was an attempt to gain the attention of prison officials." He
believed that his life was in danger from other inmates who wanted to kill him as a result
of racial tensions during a previous prison term. 43 Prevatte wanted to be transferred to a
North Carolina prison where he felt he would be safe."
Prevatte argued that constitutional guarantees enabled him to refuse force-feedings."
He contended that he had a right, derived from the substantive due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, to control his own body:16 He also argued that his right to express
himself through a hunger strike was entitled to first amendment protection." Prevatte's
argument concluded, therefore, that the state's attempt to compel nourishment uncon-
stitutionally encroached upon his protected rights." The state countered Prevatte's ar-
gument by asserting that its interests outweighed the prisoner's rights and therefore
justified the force-feeding." Georgia claimed that it had a duty to protect the health of
those incarcerated in the state penal system.5° In addition, the state contended that it had
a compelling interest in the preservation of life."
Considering these opposing arguments, the Zant court agreed that the state was
obliged to protect prisoners in its custody, 52 but nevertheless refused to allow the state to
force-feed a sane prisoner on that basis." The court recognized that the prisoner's
incarceration acted as a limitation on his constitutional rights." The court stated, how-
ever, that a prisoner does not relinquish his privacy right because of his status. 55 Balancing
37 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982).
38 Id. at 832, 286 S.E.2d at 715.
38 Id. 286 S.E.2d at 716.
4'1 Id. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716. Ketosis is a condition where the human body metabolizes its own
proteins for food in the prolonged absence of normal nourishment. A. LEH N ING ER, 131ocuEsusTRY
847 (1975). This process has been referred to as "self-cannabilization." Id.
" 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716. The prison doctors believed that unless he was force-fed,
Prevatte would die within three weeks. Id.
". Id.
" Id. Prevatte feared for his safety although no attempt had been made on his life, nor could he
identify any of his prospective murderers. Id. He attributed the plan to kill him to racial conflicts he
experienced during a previous prison term of several years in a Georgia state prison. Id.
44 Id.
" Id.
40 id .
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
" Id.
57 Id. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 716.
" Id. at 833-34, 286 S.E.2d at 716-17. The state court cited two Georgia Court of Appeals cases
in recognition of the state's duty to keep its prisoners from harm. Id. (citing Thomas v. Williams, 105
Ga. App. 321, 327, 124 S.E.2d 409, 412 (1962); Kendrick v. Adamson, 51 Ga. App. 402, 403, 180 S.E.
647, 648 (1935)).
" Zant, 248 Ga. at 833-34, 286 S.E.2d at 716-17.
54 See id. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716.
55 Id. at 833-34, 286 S.E.2d at 716.
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Georgia's contention that there exists .a compelling state interest in the preservation of
human life, 56 the court declared that'such a compelling interest does not outweigh the
prisoner's constitutional right of privacy.57 Thus, the court ruled that a prisoner's right:to
self-determination may not be frustrated even by the state's compelling interest in the
preservation of life." In support of this important principle, however, the only authority
cited by the Zant court was .three state court cases involving the right of seriously ill
patients to refuse life-saving medical treatment.59 The Zant court thus concluded that
state may not compel a hunger-striking prisoner to eat. 6" in reaching 'its decision, the
court balanced two individual constitutional rights 61 and two state interests, 6:2 and
adopted a new expansive interpretation of the privacy right .without the aid of any
constitutional authority."
In Von Holden v, Chaptnan, 6:' a New York appeals court" considered a petition
brought by the Director of the New York Psychiatric ,Center." The director, Martin H.
Von Holden, had applied to the Special Term of the New York Supreme Court — the
state trial court — for an order authorizing him to feed a prisoner intravenously or by
means of a nasal gastric tube." The prisoner — Mark David Chapman, convicted
murderer of John Lennon, the former 13eatle" — had not eaten for twenty-two days."
Chapman's asserted purpose in hunger-striking was to draw public attention to the plight
of starving children in the world.'" The trial court adjudged Chapman competent, even
though he had frequently expressed an intent to commit suicide. 71 The court granted the
director's petition and Chapman appealed to the state appeals court."
" Id. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 717. 	 •
57
	 Thus, the Zant court held in favor of the prisoner on the basis of his privacy claim. Id.
Since the court found the prisoner's asserted privacy right dispositive, it did not even discuss the
right of free expression as a potential protection of the right to hunger-strike. See id. at 832-34, 286
S.E.2d at 715-17.
" Id, at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 717.
" Id. (citing Lane v. Candura, .6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978) (77-year-old
woman allowed to refuse life-saving operation involving amputation of her gangrenous leg); In re
Quakenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1976) (72 -year-old man allowed to refuse amputa-
tion of both legs even though he would die without operation); In re Yetter„62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (Dist.
Ct. 1973) (patient allowed to refuse surgical removal of breast even though death would result
without surgery)).
66 Id. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 717.
6 ' Id. at 833-34, 286 S.E.2d at 716. The court recognized the individual's right to self-
determination and bodily integrity. Id,
62 Id. The court identified the state's interests in the preservation of life and the duty to protect
its prisoners. Id.
63 See id. at 833-34, 286 S.E.2d at 716 - 17. The Court held that "Prevatte, hy.virtue of his right of
privacy, can refuse to allow intrusions on his person, even though calculated to save his life." Id. at
834, 286 S.E.2d at 717. In reaching this result in a case involving important applications of substan-
tive due process in the prison context, the court cited and relied on only five cases, all of which were
state trial or intermediate-appellate court decisions. See supra notes 52 and 59.
° 4 87 A.D.2d at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 623 (1982).
65 The Fourth Department of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court.
66 87 A.D.2d at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
67 Id. at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
66 Id. at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
66 14.
70 Id. at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2r1 at 624.
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The appeals court in Chapman rejected the prisoner's contention that his right to
privacy allowed him to refuse intrusions on his person." The court, citing no authority,
simply concluded it is "self-evident" that the right to privacy does not include the right to
commit suicide. 74 The court cited two United States Supreme Court decisions —Palko v.
Connecticut' and Roe v. Wade" — for the principle that only personal rights which can be
deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are within the
guaranteed privacy right." These principles led the appeals court in Chapman to conclude
that it would be "ludicrous" to give self-destructive acts constitutional protections."
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the compelling interest of the state in preventing
suicide would outweigh any privacy right Chapman might possess." Thus, the appeals
court allowed New York to force-feed the hunger-striking prisoner, Chapman. 8 °
Having reached its decision against the prisoner, the Chapman court then proceeded
to distinguish the contrary result in the Zant decision. 8 ' According to the court, Zant
erroneously relied on cases involving the right to refuse radical surgery. 82 The Chapman
court held that the state's compelling interest in the prevention of suicide clearly distin-
guished hunger strike cases from refusal-of-medical-treatment cases." Under this reason-
ing, the Chapman court believed Zant to have been incorrectly decided."
In addition, the Chapman court reached the free expression claim not discussed by
the Zant cobrt. 85 Chapman asserted that his hunger strike was symbolic speech entitled to
the protections of the first amendment." Relying on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Bell v. Wolfish," however, the state appeals court in Chapman concluded that
the legitimate ends of prison security and adminstration may justify reasonable limitations
on the inmate's first amendment rights." The Chapman court held that in the case at bar
the state had a legitimate interest in the maintenance of order and discipline within the
prison." Thus, the court held that the state's interest outweighed any restricted free
expression right of the inmate."
In State ex rel. White v. Narick, 9 ' the prisoner, Jesse White, sought injunctive relief to
prevent prison officials from force-feeding him." White commenced his strike to protest
prison conditions at the West Virginia State Penitentiary." When prison officials first .
" Id. at 70, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 626-27.
" See id. at 68, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
" 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
" 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" 87 A.D.2d at 68, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
' 3 Id.
78 id. at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
" Id. at 71, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
" Id. at 69, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
82 Id.
83 Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 70, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
" Id.
87 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
88 87 A.D.2d at 70, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
" Id. at. 70-71, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
" Id. at 71, 450 N. Y.S.2d at 627.
" 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982).
" Id. at 55.
93 Id. Shortly after the case was argued, White voluntarily ended his fast. Id. at 55 n.l. He began
working as a cook in the prison kitchen and regained fifty pounds in his first four months on the job.
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announced their intention to feed White intravenously, he sought an injunction from the
state trial court." The trial court denied the petition and White sought a writ of
prohibition against the trial court judge, Narick, from the West Virginia Supreme
Court."
The Narick court undertook a detailed examination of case law concerning prisoners'
rights." First, the court's review of case precedent established that inmates retain their
constitutional rights while in the state's custody — such as the rights to receive political
publications," to enjoy equal protection of laws," to practice their religion" and to
engage in free speech.'°° Second, the Narick court noted that these rights are by necessity
limited by the requirements of prison custody.'°' The court cited several examples where
limitations were upheld including limits on the access of the media, 10 ' the right to receive
outside publications,'" and - the right to free association.'" In its review of the precedent,
however, the Narick court did not discuss the right to privacy as it relates to inmates in
state custody.'°5
Following its general discussion of the scope of prisoners' constitutional rights, the
Narick court considered the reasoning of the Georgia Supreme Court in Zant.'" The West
Virginia court quoted a passage from Zant in which the Georgia court concluded that the
state could not force-feed a hunger-striking prisoner,' 07 and then distinguished the
passage from Zant on two general grounds. 105 First, the Narick court disagreed with the
Id. The court nevertheless refused to deem the issue moot, noting that the controversy fell within the
"capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception employed by the courts. Id. Cf. Southern Pac.
Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 514-15 (1911) (short-term ICC orders
would otherwise avoid review altogether since they ordinarily would expire before case could be
heard).
" 292 S.E.2d at 55.
" Id.
" See generally id. at 56. The Narick court cited nine United States Supreme Court cases and
eight lower federal court cases which generally stood for the proposition that some constitutional
protections are fully retained by prison inmates, while others are limited. Id. For a brief discussion of
some or these cases see infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
97 292 S.E.2d at 56 (citing Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 28 (5th Cir. 1969)).
" 292 S.E.2d at 56 (citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1968)).
99 292 S.E.2d at 56 (citing Cruz v. Beth, 405 U.S. 319, 322 t 1972)).
100 292 S.E.2d. at 56 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974)).
1 " 292 S.E.2d at 56.
" 2 Id, (citing liouchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 1978)).
103 292 S.E.2d at 56 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550 (1979)).
'" 292 S.E.2d at 56 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 133 (1977)).
"5 71, 292 S.E.2d at 54.
11 Id. at 56-57.
" 7 Id. (citing Zant, 248 Ga. at 833-34, 286 S.E.2d at 716-17).
1 " 292 S.E.2d at 56-57. The Narick court adopted an unusual method to distinguish Zant. The
court incorporated its own comments (in italics) into the passage quoted from Zant. Id.
A prisoner does not relinquish his constitutional right to privacy because of his status as
a prisoner. One could hardly conceive of a more drastic curb on privacy than being in prison.
The state has no right to monitor this man's physical condition against his will neither
does it have the right to feed him to prevent his death from starvation if that is his wish.
Could it immunize him against his will to prevent the spread of disease to other prisoners?
The state argued in this proceeding that there is a compelling state interest in
preserving any human life. The Court notes that Prevatte was at one time under a
death sentence. To take the State's argument to its logical conclusion, were Prevatte still
under a death sentence the state would ask the Court to keep him alive against his will
so it could later kill him. This argument fails if the state has no death penalty.
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Lant court's conclusion that incarceration did not preclude limitations on a prisoner's
privacy right, stating instead that imprisonment necessarily entails drastic curbs on that
right.'" Second, contrary to the conclusion in Loot, the Narick court held that one of the
state's major tasks is deciding life and death issues, even where such decisions affect a
prisoner's right to self-determination."" In addition, the ;Vapick court faulted the Lan!
decision for failing to consider the state's compelling interest in the preservation of life.''
After satisfying itself that. %ant was distinguishable, the Narick court turned to a
discussion of state interests acting as limitations on the right to privacy. 12 The Narick
court. adopted its list of state interests from a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
opinion involving a decision to refuse life-saving medical treatmem." 3 In Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,'" the Massachusetts high court articulated a number
of state interests which were intended to be balanced against the individual's constitu-
tional right to privacy.'" The Narick court, however, adopted only the Saikewicz court's
list, and, having identified those interests, did not engage in the caref ul balancing process
arguably required.'" Moreover, while the Narick court cited decisions which allowed
competent patients to refuse medical treatment,'" the court distinguished those cases
from the case of a hunger striker on the basis of the "dim prognosis" theory.""
in conclusion, the Narick court held that the state interests in the preservation of
human life and the prevention of suicide easily outweighed White's right to self-
determinat ion," 9 In this manner, the court dismissed the prisoner's privacy claim.' 2 ° The
Such apprt)aches to legal questions point out the perils of the state becoming
involved in deciding life or death issues. One of its mayor tasks! The state can incarcerate
one who has violated the lass' and, in certain circumstances, even take his life. But it has
no right to destroy a person's will by frustrating his attempt to die, if necessary, to make
a point . ... Nothing could destroy a person'.s will more than death. Under these circum-
stances, we hold that Prevatie, by virtue of his right of privacy, can refuse to allow
intrusions on his person, even though calculated to preserve his life. The state has not
shown such a compelling interest in preserving Prevane's life as would override his
right to refuse medical treatment .
We do not agree with Lent.
M. (citing %ant, 248 Ga. at 833-34, 286 S.E.2d al 716-17) (Narick court's comments in italics).
1 " 292 S.E.2d at 56.
"(" Id. at 56-57.
"' Id. at 57. But see Loot, 248 Ga. at 83'l, 286 S.E.2d at 716, where the Georgia court expressly
recognized the state's compelling interest in the preservation of life.
112 292 S.E.2d at 57.
13 Id. (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 729, 370
N.E.2d 417, 419 (1977)).
14 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
1 ' 5 See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
1 16 See Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 57.
'" Id. (citing Satz v. Perlmutter, 363 So.2d 160 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. t978),affd, 379 So.2d 359
(Ha. 1980); 1,aue v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.
I0, 355 A.2d 4147, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d
785 (1978); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (Dist. Ct. 1973).
l's 292 S.E.2d at 58. The "dim prognosis" theory recognizes a limited right to die only in those
cases where there is no hope of a long-term recovery. Id. TheNarick court noted that "people cannot
he forced to live through excruciating pain . . . protestations for causes however, are emotional
commitments as various and unpredictable as the winds." Id. For a discussion of the dim prognosis
theory, see infra notes 485-99 and accompanying text.
"g 292 S.E.2d at 58. The ,Varick court cited John Updike's novel, RABarr as RICH, as authority
for the proposition that the state's interest in the preservation of human life is at "the very core of
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court also summarily dismissed White's claim of free expression. 121 In the final paragraph
of the opinion, the court concluded that such first amendment rights were clearly inferior
to the interests of the state. 122
In summary, the three 1982 hunger strike cases have not yielded consistent law.
Rather, the courts have held concerns or rights determinative.'" A fully developed
analytic framework for treating hunger-strike cases remains to be developed. This note,
therefore, will attempt to frame and apply the appropriate constitutional analysis.' 24 The
next section begins building the appropriate constitutional framework,
H. TILE CASE OF THE HUNGER-STRIKING PRISONER:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
From the foregoing description, it is arguable that each of the courts in Zane,
Chapman and Narick inadequately examined the constitutional questions raised by the
hunger striker's action."' Hunger striking, however, is a common incident in prisons
throughout the country,' 25 and is likely to be the subject of several suits in the near
fut.ure.' 27 This section, therefore, proposes an analytical framework within which the case
civilization." 292 S.E.2d at 58. The "persuasive" authority for the court's shibboleth against suicide is
spoken through the character of Harry Angstrom in Updike's novel:
Maybe 1 haven't done everything right in my life, 1 know 1 haven't. But I haven't
committed the greatest sin, I haven't laid down and died.
Who says that's the greatest sin?
Everybody says it. The Church, the government ... .
292 S.E.2d at 58 1i.4 (citing J. UPDIKE, RABBIT IS RICH (1981)).
1 " 292 S.E.2d at 58.
121 Id ,
122 Id. The court placed emphasis upon the availability of other channels of protest, most
notably, legal proceedings. Id. at 58 & 0.7.
'3 See supra notes 37- 122 and accompanying text.
123 See infra notes 125-479 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 37-124 and accompanying text.
1211 Besides the four hunger-strike cases already discussed, there have been at least 23 other
cases where the courts have taken judicial notice of prisoners' hunger strikes as a form of protest. See
Paxton v. United States, No. 83-1197, slip op. (8th Cir. Feb. 17, ]984) (available March 1, 1984, on
LEX1S, Genfed library, Cir. file); United States v. Toner, No. 83-1287, slip op. (2d Cir. Feb. 14, 1984)
(available March 1, 1984, on LE XIS, Genfed library, Cir. file); Sanchez v. United States, No. 83- 6356,
slip op. (2d Cir. Jan. 5, 1984) (available March 1, 1984, on 1.EX1S, Genfed library, Cir. file); 'Walker v,
Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 968 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Sessions, 672 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 1982); Africa v.
Zimmerman, 622 F.2d 1025, 1028 (3d Cir. 1981), cm. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1756 (1982); Jones v.
Marquez, 526 F. Supp. 871, 873 (1). Ran. 1981); Adams v. Wainwright, 512 F. Supp. 948, 952 (N.D.
Ha. 198 1); Maxton v. Johnson, 488 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (D.S.C. 1980); Perrote v. Percy, 444 F. Supp.
1288, 1289 (IA'.D. Wis. 1978); Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 577 (E.D. Wash. 1975); United States v.
Bracey, 368 F. Supp. 1186, 1187 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Williams v. United States, 353 E. Supp. 1226, 1229
(E.D. La. 1973); Elie v, Henderson, 340 F. Supp. 958, 964 (E.D. La. 1972); Chandler v. United States,
332 E. Supp. 397, 398 (D. Md. 1971); Cullen v. Grove Press, 276 F. Supp. 727, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Cruse v. State, No. 1 Div. 639, slip op. (Ala. Grim. App. January 19, 1984) (available March 1, 1984,
on LEX1S, states library, Omni file); Frendak v. United States.. 408 A.2d 364, 377 (D.C. 1979);
Costello v. Strickland, 421 So.2d 33, 33-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); In re Under, 96 Misc. 2d 234,
236, 408 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Washington v. Hartzog, 96 Wash. 2d 383, 386, 635 P.2d
694, 696 (1981); in re Young, 95 Wash. 2d 216, 218, 622 P.2d 373, 374 (1980); Emerson v. Nehls, 94
Wis. 2d 196, 197, 287 N.W.2d 808 (1980).
"7 Given that at least 27 instances of hunger strikes have been before both federal and state
courts, see supra note 126, there is no reason to doubt that this trend will continue.
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of a hunger-striking prisoner may be decided.' 28 This framework is intended to serve as a
guide and analysis to courts faced with the difficult questions posed by a prisoner's desire
to die by starvation.
Resolving properly whether a hunger-striking prisoner has a constitutional right to
die involves balancing the individual's rights against the interests of the state.'" This
balancing, in turn, mandates a careful enumeration of all considerations weighing in
either the individual's or state's favor. First, the constitutional rights of the prisoner must
be described and defined.' 35 Second, the effect of the inmate's "prisoner" status on his
constitutional rights must be explored.'" Next, the relevant state interests in the inmate
hunger-strike context must be defined and categorized. 132 Finally, the interests of the state
defined must be balanced against the hunger striker's constitutional rights in the prison
context.'" This process, while laborious, ensures consistency in court analysis and pro-
vides an avenue for the appropriate resolution of the hunger-strike cases.
A. Constitutional Rights of the Hunger-Striking- Prisoner
In Zant, Chapman and Narick, the prisoners all attempted to invoke the protection of
the first and fourteenth amendments.'" Each claimed that his rights under these
amendments prevented prison officials from force-feeding him. 135
 These constitutional
privacy and free expression rights, therefore, will be discussed below. 136 In addition, the
prisoner's incarceration will be examined as a limitation on these rights."'
1. The Right to Privacy
In each of the hunger strike cases, the prisoner contended that his right to privacy, a
constitutional guarantee,'" precluded prison officials' efforts to force-feed him.'" Spe-
cifically, each hunger striker argued that two facets'" of his privacy right — the rights to
128 See infra notes 129-349 and accompanying 'ext.
129
 See, e.g,, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union,
433 U.S. 119, 129 (1979).
"° See infra notes 134-222 and accompanying text.
131 See infra notes 223-42 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 243-318 and accompanying text.
"3 See infra notes 350-479 and accompanying text.
"4 See Zant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624;
Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 57.
"5 Zant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624;
Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 57.
' 3 ' See infra notes 138 - 222 and accompanying text.
137 See infra notes 223-42 and accompanying text.
"8
 The constitutional right to privacy was expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). The Court indicated that the constitutional source
lies in the penumbras of the first, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 484-86.
Several "zones of privacy" invoke the protection of the Constitution, including the freedom to obtain
contraceptives, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), and decisions whether to bear children.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). The Court, however, has also noted that the outer limits of
the right to privacy have not yet been defined. Carey v. Population Services int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685
(1977).
13 ° Zant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 67-68, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625;
Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 57.
"° The right to privacy has many different facets, including personal appearance, Kelley v.
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976); sexual conduct, Carey v. Population Services Intl, 431 U.S. 678,
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self-determination and bodily integrity — would be impinged if nourishment were forced
upon him."' While of all the various components, these two privacy right interests
arguably are the most appropriate," 2 their application in the context of inmate hunger
strikes requires further exploration. 143
The right to bodily control and integrity, recognized by the Supreme Court since
1891,144 provides constitutional assurance for the individual's autonomy over his body,
including the right to choose or refuse medical treatment.' 45 As a component of the right
of privacy, the right to bodily control prohibits intrusion upon an individual's possession
and control of his own person, absent authorization by law.' 46 In Union Pacific Railway v.
Botsford," 7 the plaintiff, Botsford, refused to undergo a medical examination at the
defendant railroad's request, asserting that her right to control her person enabled her to
decline such an examination." 9 The Supreme Court upheld the plaintiff's right to refuse
an examination, stating that every individual has the right to possession and control of his
own person, free from interference unless by authority of law. 199 The right (0 bodily
integrity was also at issue in Scholendorff v. New York Hospital. 16" In that case, the plaintiff
complained that the defendant hospital and staff performed surgery upon her without
her consent.'" Speaking for the New York Court of Appeals, Justice Cardozo noted that
687-88 (1977); freedom from bodily invasion, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966);
self-determination, Roe v. Wade, 910 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); confidentiality of personal information,
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977); and privacy of belief and thought. Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969).
"' See Zant, 248 Ga. at 832-34, 286 S.E.2d at 715-17; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 66-71, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 623-27; Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 54-58.
'" The hunger-strike case, where the prisoner refuses to eat, is similar to refusal of medical
treatment cases, where the patient declines further medical efforts. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d
160, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff 'd, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980). In refusal of medical treatment
cases, the rights to self-determination and bodily integrity generally are deemed to protect the
patient. Id. See also Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline 14e-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily integrity
Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTCERS L. REV. 228, 241 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Cantor, Bodily
Integrity] (describing right to refuse medical treatment under component privacy rights of self-
determination and bodily integrity).
' 43 Like the patient in Cantor's article, supra note 142, a hunger striker is similarly refusing
medical treatment and will claim the same individual rights as the patient. The analysis differs,
however, in evaluating the relevant state interests. The hunger striker faces a formidable array of
state interests, not the least of which is the strong societal stigma against the termination of an
otherwise healthy life. Moreover, the hunger striker is a prisoner of the state, which subjects the
analysis to the infusion of a whole new array of state interests, For a discussion of these interests, see
infra notes 288-318 and accompanying text.
" 4 Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
14 ' See Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 NIA'.
U.L. REV. 461, 490-94 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Plotkin, Mental Patients' Right to Refuse]; see also
Comment, The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment: Under What Circumstances Does It Exist? 18 DUQ. L.
REV. 607, 609 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Right to Refuse Treatment].
'" Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 11 (1940).
'" 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
I" Id. at 251. The holding of this case was explained in Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1940),
where the Court required the plaintiff to undergo a medical exam under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id. at 12. In Sibbach, the Court explained that the substantive right described in Botsford
was still valid. Sibbach, 312 U.S. al 11. Sibbach illustrates the necessary procedure required to
overcome this important substantive right. See id.
' 49 Botsford, 141 U.S. at 251.
199 SC1110e11(10Eff v. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
"' Id. at 127, 105 N.E. at 93.
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every adult of sound mind has the right to determine what shall be done with his body.'"
The New York high court, therefore, held that the plaintiff's right to bodily control and
integrity had been violated by the nonconsensual surgery. 153
More recently, the United States Supreme Court reiterated its conclusion that the
integrity of the person is a cherished value in our society.'" In Schmerber v. California,"5
the Court scrutinized a police-ordered blood test of a suspected drunken driver."° The
plaintiff, Schmerber, challenged the blood test on the grounds, inter alia, that it was an
unwarrented invasion of personal privacy and dignity.'" While upholding the gov-
ernmental intrusion, the Schmerber Court. recognized that human dignity and privacy are
"fundamental human interests." 15" Moreover, in the years since Schmerber, many courts
have ruled that the right to bodily integrity is an important component of the right to
privacy.'"
The tight to bodily integrity and control, as described above, allows an individual to
refuse medical treatments or procedures which have an invasive effect on his person,
absent authorization by law."" Force-feeding is a medical procedure which compels the
individual to ingest nutrients intravenously or otherwise."' Such feedings are manifestly
nonconsensual and therefore violate the individual's right to control his own person.
Thus, the state must demonstrate that its interests in force-feeding overcome the individ-
ual's privacy right for the action to be valid under the Constitution." 2
The second aspect of the right to privacy asserted by hunger strikers — the right to
self-determination — comprises a constitutional guarantee of the individual's right to
choose a life-style or course of conduct."3
 The right to decide upon a course of conduct is
a necessary prerequisite to the enjoyment of all other liberties and thus is a fundamental
aspect of personal liberty.'" This fundamental right. gives constitutional assurance to the
" 2 Id. at 129, 105 N.E. at 93.
"3 Id.
" 4
 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966).
" 5 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
"6 Id. at 759.
'" Id. at 767.
235 Id. at 770.
" 9 In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 376 (D.C. 1972); Satz v. Perlmutter, 352 So.2d 160, 164 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978),aff'd, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d
647, 644, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Vetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2(1 619, 622 (Dist. et . 1973).
' 6" See Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 241; Plotkin, Mental Patients' Right to Refuse,
supra note 145, at 490-92.
' 01 See, e.g., Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at. 625.
` 62 See infra notes 350-479 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of this issue. See also
Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 623, where the New York appellate court weighed the
interests of the state in overcoming the individual's privacy right against the prisoner's asserted
protections. Id.
"3 Comment, The Right to Refuse Treatment, supra note 145, at 609.
"4 The right to self-determination is at the core of Western liberal philosophy. John Stuart Mill
asserted in On Liberty (1849), (reprinted in THE U9'H.ITAR1ANS 473 (1961)) that such individual has
absolute sovereignty over his mind and body, with the sole limitation that his acts cannot harm other
indiitiduals. Id. at 484. According to Mill, the state cannot compel an individual to do an act, even for
beneficial purposes, without detracting from the inherent worth of mankind. See id. at 597. Jeremy
Bentham also placed the right to self-determination at the center of his philosophical framework.
Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals . and Legislation (1776) (reprinted in THE UTILLTAR-
LANs 5 (1961)). In Bentham's system of utilitarianism, it is the individual who determines what
actions to take by examining their consequences. Id. at 17- 19.
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individual's decision-making process, allowing him to live his life as he chooses, without
unwarranted governmental intrusions.'"
Several Supreme Court opinions have discussed an individual's right to self-
determination. As early as 1928, Justice Brandeis' formulation of the "right to be let
alone' in his dissent in Olmstead v. United Stales'" evidenced judicial dissatisfaction with
state infringements of personal liberty."' The full Court, however, first expressly recog-
nized the privacy right to self-determination in Griswold v. Connecticut.'" Griswold involved
a Connecticut statute which proscribed the distribution of contraceptives to married
couples. 169 The petitioner, a physician who distributed contraceptives, challenged the
statute on the grounds of t he  due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.'" The
Court struck down the statute on the basis of the right to privacy, indicating that the
constitutional source lay in the penumbra of the first, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth
amendments.'"
The individual's right to self-determination was also recognized in Roe v. Wade. 12 In
Roe, a pregnant woman brought a class action claiming that the Texas criminal abortion
laws violated her class's constitutional right to privacy. 173 Justice Blackmun, speaking for
the Court, held that a woman's right to decide whether to bear a child outweighed any
interest the state had in preventing abortion during at least the first trimester.' 74 The
Court, therefore, struck clown the statute as an infringement upon the class's right to
self-determination.' 75 Thus, the Roe Court concluded that the right to self-determination
was fundatnental. 176
Subsequently, the Court extended the right to self-determination beyond matters of
procreation. In Stanley v. Georgia, 17 the petitioner challenged his conviction under a state
statute which punished mere private possession of obscene matter on grounds that the
conviction violated his first and fourteenth amendment rights."6 In striking down the
statute, the Court reasoned that the right to gather and read all information was essential
to the development of ideas, since it is from these very ideas that an individual determines
165 See Whalen v. Roc, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967).
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
'" Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissent ing). Brandeis' dissent provides the foundation for the present
judicial recognition of the constitutional right to privacy. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969) (citing Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 378 (Brandeis, j., dissenting)). The eloquent "right to be let alone"
passage provides the first articulation of the fundamental right to think, believe and act free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. Id.
"H 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1 " Id. at 480.
TO hi.
171 Id. at 484-86. The Court subsequently extended this privacy right to all individuals in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), a case also involving contraceptives. In that case, the
Court refined the notion that Griswold only protected marital privacy: "If the right to privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmen-
tal intrusions into matters so fundamentally affecting an individual as t he decision whether to bear or
beget a child." Id.
'" 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'"s Id. at 120.
' 74 Id. at 164.
175 Id. at 162-63.
16 See id. at 152-54.
1 " 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
176 Id. at 568.
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his actions: 19 In addition, the Court acknowledged that this right is fundamental and that
the individual possesses the right to be free from unwarrented intrusions into his pri-
vacy.'" In Whalen v. Roe,'" the Court again found that the right to privacy extended
beyond matters of the family and procreation.'" That case involved a challenge to New
York's computerized record-keeping system for the distribution of certain drugs on the
grounds that it violated patients' rights to privacy.'" While the Court found that the
system was justified by legitimate needs of the state, it expressly stated that "some personal
rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' , are so 'fundamental that an
undefined penumbra may provide them with an independent source of constitutional
protection.' "184 Thus, the Supreme Court has indicated that the privacy right is to be
construed as a broad protection of personal liberty.'"
In the context of a hunger-striking prisoner, the right to self-determination may
protect the individual's decision not to eat. A hunger striker has evaluated his condition
and the conditions of the world around him, and based upon that evaluation, has decided
upon a specific course of conduct.' 86 As long as the individual chooses his own course of
action, the government may not interfere because it deems the conduct to be foolish or
ill-advised." 7 Such governmental intervention, if allowed on these grounds, would emas-
culate the right to self-determination by allowing individuals to "choose" only life-styles
approved by the government.'" Thus, the hunger striker must be given the freedom to
act out any course of conduct he chooses, absent compelling interests of the state." 9
In summary, a hunger striker may attempt to invoke the constitutional right of
privacy to protect his strike by asserting both the right to self-determination'" and the
right to bodily integrity."' These two components of the constitutional right will, for the
"9 Id. at 565. The Court noted that if Stanley's constitutional guarantees "means anything, it
means that a state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may
read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men's minds." Id.
'" Id. at. 564.
"" 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
'" Id. at 599-600. The court stated that cases concerning privacy "have in fact involved at least
two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important deci-
sions." Id.
" 3 Id. at 872.
'" Id. at 876 n.23.
1" See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-1-15- 14 (1978). Tribe divides the right
of privacy into several separate freedoms, including liberty of conscience, id. at § 15-5, freedom of
inquiry and education, id. at § 15-6, freedom from physical invasion, id. at § 15-9, freedom to make
decisions about death, id. at § 15-11, and freedom of choice of a life plan or style, id. at § 15- 12.
"" See, e.g., Zant, 248 Ga. at 832, 286 S.E.2d at 715, where the prisoner believed that his life was
in danger. Cognizant of his situation as a prisoner of the state, Zant embarked on the only course of
conduct that he thought proper. See id.
" 7 Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 383, 376 N,E.2d 1232, 1235 (1978) ("The law
protects her right to make her own decision to accept or reject treatment whether that decision is wise
or unwise."); In re Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 373, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1965) ("Even though we may
consider appellant's beliefs unwise, foolish or ridiculous . . . we may not permit interference
therewith . . . ."); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 397 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
1" See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-12 (1978).
1 " For a balancing of the state's interests against the individual's privacy right, see infra notes
355-411 and accompanying text.
19° See supra notes 163-89 and accompanying text.
151 See supra notes 144-62 and accompanying text.
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purposes of this note, be referred to as the right of personal privacy.'" Hence, the
prisoner may assert this right of "personal privacy" as a bar to the attempts of prison
officials to force-feed him, and thereby put an end to his hunger strike.' 93
2. The Right of Free Expression
Along with the right to privacy, the hunger striker may attempt to invoke protection
under the first amendment.'" The first amendment protects the individual from state
actions which abridge freedom of speech.' 95 To be protected under the first amendment,
therefore, the hunger strike must be viewed as symbolic speech 195
 by means of which the
prisoner is attempting to communicate.' 97
 Once so viewed, an attempt to force-feed the
inmate would disrupt the hunger strike's symbolic speech, and would constitute an
infringement of the prisoner's right to free expression,'" Under this reasoning, the
hunger striker would argue that he is protected from the actions of the prison officials by
the first amendment.' 99
Generally, the right to free expression includes the right to communicate views or
ideas to any willing listener. 200 Moreover, the manner of communication need not be
written or verbal, since conduct constituting symbolic speech has long been accorded first
amendment protection."' The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that the con-
stitutional guarantee of free expression does not protect every kind of conduct intended
as an expression of an idea.'" For example, in United States v. O'Brien, 2 ° 3 the Court held
"2 See Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 241.
"3
 See, e.g., Zant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 713; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 66-67, 450 N.Y.S.2d
at 625; Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 57. Each of the prisoners in Zant, Chapman, and Narick argued that his
right to privacy protected his hunger strike. Id. This protection, each prisoner asserted, allowed him
to refuse force-feedings by prison officials. Id. 292 S.E.2d at 57. It seems reasonable to assume that
any future hunger striker will attempt to invoke the right to privacy.
194 See, e.g., Zant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2c1 at 713; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at
624; Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 58. The prisoners in Zant, Chapman, and Narick each argued that his first
amendment right of free expression protected his hunger strike. Id. The state's attempt to force-feed
him, each prisoner contended, was an unconstitutional restriction of that freedom. Id.
'" U,S. Const. amend. 1. The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law . .
abridging freedom of speech . . . ." Id.
'9°
	
speech can he defined as conduct which by its very nature is "so intertwined with
expression" as to bring the first amendment into play. See Cowgill v. California, 396 U.S. 371,
(mutilated flag held not to be protected symbolic speech); Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381,
1386 (D.N.H. 1976) ("Live Free or Die" on New Hampshire license plate is symbolic speech); Crosson
v. Silver, 391 F. Supp. 1081, 1086 (D. Ariz. 1976) (burning of flag is symbolic speech within first
amendment protection).
197 The hunger strikers in Zant, Chapman and Narick all intended their refusal to eat to be a
protest against a specific condition. See Zant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d
at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625; Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 55. Prevatte wanted to alert prison officials that
someone was trying to kill him. Zant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716. Chapman was trying to focus
world attention on the plight of starving children. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
White's hunger strike was in protest of prison conditions. Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 55.
1 " See, e.g., Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
199 Id. at 70, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
200 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
291 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 505-14 (1969); Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
202 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) {involving first amendment challenge to
criminal conviction for improper display of American flag); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
376 (1968).
2 " 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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that the public burning of a draft card did not constitute protected speech.'" In O'Brien,
the defendant burned his selective service card as a statement against the war in Viet-
nam."' The act violated a selective service regulation. 206 The defendant argued that the
first amendment cloaked his action, since it was intended as a political statement. 207 The
O'Brien Court rejected the argument, reasoning that the incidental effect of the selective
service regulation on O'Brien's first amendment rights was justified by the important
governmental interest in raising armies.'"
The Supreme Court has also recognized that where free expression consists of the
commission of public acts, the scope of the permissible regulation increases.'" For
example, in California v. LaRue,'" the appellees asserted that state restrictions preventing
the sale of alcohol in nightclubs with "live entertainment" consisting of "bottomless
dancers" was violative of their first amendment rights as nightclub owners and dancers."'
The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that when free expression consists largely of
conduct, the state has broad power to regulate such conduct without infringing the
protections of the first amendment.'" Thus, the Court upheld the state regulations, even
though it recognized a limited effect on the appellees' free expression rights. 213 In
addition, the Court has held that conduct, as a means of expression, does not invoke the
"absolute" protection usually associated with free speech. 214 For example, in Village of
Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 2 " a group of party members were held to be
entitled to Write and disseminate pamphlets expressing their political views, but were
prevented from marching through a predominantly Jewish neighborhood. 216 The party
members claimed that the local government's refusal to issue a permit to march violated
their first amendment associational and free expression rights. 2 " The Court ruled that the
state could legitimately restrict the first amendment rights of the party members to insure
public peace and prevent violence and personal injury."'
Applying these first amendment principles to the hunger-strike context, the first
question is whether the hunger strike is a form of protected expression.'" A hunger
strike, as both conduct and speech, allows the state much broader authority to limit the
speech element.'" The second question, then, is whether the state's interest in regulating
the conduct element of a hunger strike justifies the incidental restriction of the speech
element. 22 ' As in Village of Skokie, the free expression rights of the individual may be
204
	 at 386.
Id. at 369-70.
2 " Id. at '370.
207 Id.
200
	 at 377.
209 California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 117 (1972).
21" 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
211 Id. at 119.
212 Id. at 118.
211 Id. at 119.
"4 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
2" 69 111. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
2" Id. at 612, 619, 373 N.E.2d at 23, 26.
2'7
216
	 generally id. at 612-19, 373 N.E.2d at 22-26.
2 ' 9 See, e.g., Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 71, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627. The Chapman court characterized
the prisoner's hunger strike as the act of suicide, rather than as symbolic speech. Id.
220 See supra notes 209-18 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 178 - 218 and accompanying text.
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overcome by a demonstration of important and conflicting state interests. 222
3. The Constitutional Rights in the Prison Context
As a prison inmate, the hunger striker's constitutional protections may be limited. 223
The prisoner, however, does not shed all of his rights at the prison gate. 224 The Supreme
Court has stated that lawful imprisonment necessarily restricts the rights and privileges
ordinarily inhering in the individual, 225 and has frequently upheld restrictions upon
prisoners' constitutional rights.226 For example, in Wolff v. McDonnell, 227 the Court al-
lowed prison officials to open inmates' mail to search for contraband. 22 " Similarly, in-
mates' right to free association was limited in Jones si. North Carolina Prisoners' Union,'
where the Court held that the prison officials could prevent the union from meeting. 23 "
Moreover, in Bell v. Wolfish, 231 the Court ruled that body cavity searches, prohibitions
upon the receipt of packages, and the "double-bunking" of initiates in a single occupancy
cell were not violations of the inmates' constitutional protections. 232 Thus, as these cases
demonstrate, a prisoner's incarceration results in a contraction of his normal constitu-
tional protections. 233
In determining the extent of this contraction, however, the Court. has stated that
there must he a mutual accommodation between the needs, and objectives of the prison
system and the provisions of the Constitution."' To achieve this, the Court has articu-
lated the following standard: the prisoner retains only those constitutional rights not
inconsistent with his status as prisoner or with the legitimate penological goals of the
corrections system. 235 This standard was employed first in Pell v. Proeunier13" to test the
validity of restrictions on an inmate's right to mail and receive correspondence, 237 and was
again applied in Jones to guide the Court in its examination of the first amendment
associational rights of prisoners."' Using this standard, the Cou rt in each case found the
restrictions to be justified by the needs of the prison sysiem."" The Court's standard
demonstrates that the extent of a prisoner's constitutional rights can only be measured in
relation to the interests of the state in administering its prisons.'" Thus, the weighing and
balancing of the interests of the state against the prisoner's asserted rights becomes the
222 See supra notes 209-18 and accompanying text.
2 " Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
224 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
221
	
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
22a
	 infra notes 227 -33 and accompanying text. This restriction is usually justified by
reference to the considerations underlying the penal system. Price, 334 U.S. at 285.
221 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
22" Id. at 574-77.
224
	
U.S. 119 (1977).
230 Id. at 136.
231 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
232
	 at 562-63.
2"2
	
supra notes 223- 32 and accompanying text.
231 Jones, 933 U.S. at 129.
gas
	 441 U.S. at 546; Jones, 433 U.S. at 129.
" 6 417 U.S. 817 (1979).
227
	 at 824.
2" Jones, 433 U.S. at 129.
"" Bell, 441 U.S. at 562 - 63; Jones, 433 U.S. at 136.
"" See supra notes 223-39 and accompanying text.
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focus of constitutional analysis. 2 " The next section, therefore, will discuss and categorize
the interests of the state. 242
B. Interests of the State
The courts have recognized several state interests applicable to the case of a hunger-
striking prisoner. 213 These interests fall into one of two general types. 244 The first of these
general categories of state interests may be referred to as "paternal" interests. Paternal
interests derive from the state's concern for the welfare of each individual. 2 " General
concepts about the sanctity of life fall into this category. z.ol The second general category
may be labeled the "institutional" interests of the state. These interests derive from the
state's need to administer its penal system. 2 " Each of the two categories encompasses a
number of legitimate state concerns assertable in the hunger-strike context which must be
carefully examined. 246
I. Paternal Interests of the State
The paternal interests of the state are premised on the belief in the sanctity of human
life. 2 " Z wo of the three hunger-strike cases expressly adopted the paternal interests cited
by the Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikereicz. 25" Saikewicz examined the right of an individual to refuse lifesaving medical
treatment."' In that case, the guardian ad (item for the mentally retarded party in interest,
Saikewicz, recommended that the treatment for leukemia be discontinued even though
the patient. would undoubtedly die. 252 The Saikewicz court examined four interests of the
state, which it weighed against the individual's right to personal privacy. 253 The four
2-11 See, e.g., Jones, 433 U.S. at 129.
242 See infra notes 243-318 and accompanying text.
2'3 None of the hunger-strike cases, however, provide a comprehensive list of the state interests
involved. In Zan!, the Georgia court identified only two state interests: the duty to protect prisoners
in custody, and preservation of life. Zant, 248 Ga. at 833- 34, 286 S.E.2d at 7 16.  In Chapman, the court
also recognized several relevant state interests: the protection of the health and welfare of persons in
its care and custody, the preservation of life and the preservation of internal order in state institu-
tions. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 66-67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624. In Narick, the court discussed the following
state interests: the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of dependents and
the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Natick, 292 S.E.2d at 57.
244 For a discussion of the state's interests see infra notes 249-318 and accompanying text.
215 See Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142 at 243: see also Comment, The Right to Refuse
Treatment, supra note 145, at 616.
2 ' 6 Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 243.
2 " See infra notes 288 - 318 and accompanying text. These institutional interests spring from
Supreme Court decisions defining the constitutional rights of prisoners. H. and accompanying text.
All of these interests focus on considerations necessary, to operate the penal system. See, e.g.,
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 398 (1974) (constitutional challenge to prison regulations
restricting prisoners' first and fourteenth amendment rights. In Procunier, the following three factors
were identified: the preservation of internal order and discipline, institutional security and the
prevention of escape, and the rehabilitation of prisoners. Id. at 412.
245 See infra notes 249-318 and accompanying text.
2' Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 243.
2 " 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). Both Chapman and Narick relied on Saikewiez.
Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 69, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 626; Narick, 292 S.E.2c1 at 57.
" 1 373 Mass. at 729, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
"2 Id. at 730, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
253 Id. at 741-45, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
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interests identified by the Saikewicz court. were the preservation of life, 254 the prevention
of suicide,'" the protection of the interests of innocent third parties 256 and the mainte-
nance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.'" After a careful balancing, the
Massachusetts high court ruled that Saikewicz's privacy right outweighed these state
concerns and that treatment could be refused.256
Saikewicz is generally recognized as the leading case articulating the paternal interests
of the state its cases involving an individual's decision to die. 2" For exatnple, in Severns v.
Wilmington Medical Center,' the Supreme Court of Delaware approvingly quoted a
passage which stated that there is a general consensus supporting the principles elabo-
rated in Saikewicz concerning invasions of personal privacy."' Moreover, Saikewicz has
been cited approvingly by several courts in this context. 262 The Saikewicz holding, there-
fore, will be used as a guidepost in the discussion of the paternal interests of the state. 263
The first state interest identified in Saikewicz was the preservation of life. 264 The
rationale behind this interest is that the state has an obligation to protect the individual's
welfare.265 The criminal law and police power are focused precisely on this concern. 266
Indeed, several governmental agencies are intended to protect the health and safety of
the population."' It is the state's duty, therefore, to prevent the death of any of its citizens
under this line of thought.. 26 " Moreover, the state's interest in the preservation of life has
been characterized as compelling by most courts."'
The second state interest articulated in Saikewicz was the prevention of suicide.'"
The underlying state interest in this area is the prevention of irrational self-destruction."'
The principal objective of the suicide statutes is to secure assistance for the individual
254 Id. at 741 - 42, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
255 Id. at 743, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
256 Id. at 742-43, '370 N.E.2d at 426.
257 Id. at 743-44, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
256
	 at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
259 See generally Riga, Euthanasia, The Right to Die and Privacy: Observations on Some Recent Cases, 11
LINCOLN L. REV. 109 (1980).
260
	
A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980).
26'
	 at 1341.
262 Rumple v. Bloomington Hosp., 	 Ind. App.	 422 N.E.2d 1309, 1312-13 (1981);
Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 22 Ohio Op. 3d 49, 55-57, 426 N.E.2d 809, 8 13-15 (Com. Plea.
1980); see also A Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment Allegedly Necessary to Sustain Life, 93 A.L.R.3d 67
(1979) [hereinafter cited as 93 A.L.R.3d 67].
263 See infra notes 264-87 and accompanying text.
264 Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
265 Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 243.
266 Id.
267
	
example, building and health inspectors, police departments, fire prevention agencies,
state hospitals, consumer product safety laws, etc., all evidence this affirmative duty on the part of the
state. In addition, the federal government also acts to protect the welfare of the individual through
medicare, Occupational Health and Safety Act, unemployment insurance, food and drug laws, etc.
266 Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 243.
266 See generally, Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 243; Comment, The Right to Refuse
Treatment, supra note 145, at 609-11; 93 A.L.R.3d 67, supra note 262, at 69-74.
27° Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 373 N.E.2d at 425.
271 •la at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 11.1 I. See Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 467, 426
N.Y.S.2d 517, 544 (1980), where the New York appellate court held that a competent decision by a
guardian to withdraw life-sustaining devices did not l'alt within the purview of the state suicide statute
since the termination "cannot be deemed 'irrational' in the sense generally connoted by the term
'suicide.' " Id.
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whose suicidal attempts are the product of rash, unbalanced or confused judgments."'
Thus, this interest is intended solely to protect the class of despondent individuals
contemplating self-destruction, and consequently is much narrower than the state interest
in the preservation of life among the general population. 2 7 3
The third state interest identified in Saikewicz was the protection of depenclents. 274
According to the Saikewicz court, the rationale behind this concern is that it is desirable to
prevent minors and incompetents from being left without support and thereby becoming
a burden on the state.275 Similarly, other courts have characterized this concern as a duty
of the patient to the community to care for his dependents. 27 " Most courts have accorded
this state interest great significance in the refusal of medical treatment cases.'" Indeed,
courts have even found that this interest, standing alone, was sufficient to displace the
individuals' privacy right. 278
 These decisions reflect judicial concern for the dependents
an individual would leave behind, and attempt to prevent the dependents from becoming
wards of the state.27 "
The final state interest treated by the Saikewicz court was the maintenance of the
ethical integrity of the medical prolession. 2 " Resides the Massachusetts court, several state
courts have recognized that a medical staff acts in contradiction to accepted medical
practices when it allows an individual to the.2N I Prevailing medical ethics, however, do not.
without exception demand that all lifesaving efforts be undertaken in all circum-
stances. 2 "2 Rather, the acceptance of a right. to terminate treat ment may he consistent with
accepted medical practices under limited conditions. 2 " 3
 The fourth state interest accords
the medical community the freedom to practice medicine under common professional
standards without undue interference by the judiciary."'
These four concerns comprise the paternal interests of the state, 285 and the state may
assert all four to countervail an individual's claimed constitutional protections. 2 " The
state, however, is not limited to these four concerns; it may also claim a variety of
institutional interests."'
222 Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 256.
273
 See id. at 257.
2" Saikeun.cz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
275 Id.
276 Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
277 See Comment, The Right to Refuse Treatment, .supra note 145, at 615-18.
278 See Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008
(D.C. Cir. 1964), Raleigh Fitkin — Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423, 201
A.2d 537, 538, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
2" See cases cited supra notes 271 - 78.
2"o
	 373 Mass. at 743, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
281 See Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
2"2 See Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FoRDiuksi L. REV. I. 31
(1975).
"3
 Id. See also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 42-50, 355 A.2d 647, 664-68, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
284 Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
295 See supra notes 249-84 and accompanying text. The Saikewicz court distilled the case law and
determined that these four general categories represented the interests of the state in this context.Id.
386
 See supra notes 249-85 and accompanying text.
2"7 See infra notes 288-318 and accompanying text,
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2. Institutional Interests of the State
As a duly convicted criminal, an inmate is a Ward of the state, 2 " is incarcerated in a
governmental institution and is obligated to obey its rules and regulations. 2 " Hence, the
state may restrict the prisoner's constitutional rights in the interest of maintaining its
penal system.290 In Procunier v. Marlinez, 291 the Supreme Conn considered the institu
tional. objectives of the state in the administration of its prison system. 2 " 2 Procunier
involved a lirst amendment challenge by prison inmates to a California prison regulation
which allowed the censorship of mail. 2 " 3 The state interests were articulated and applied
by the Court to uphold the restrictions on the prisoners' rights caused by the regula-
tion.2 " The Procunier Court identified three state interests in the prison context; the
preservation of internal order and discipline, 295 the maintenance of institutional security
against escape and unauthorized entry, 2 " and the rehabilitation of prisoners."'
Moreover, these institutional interests described in Procunier have been used by the
Court in other instances where restrictions on prisoners' rights have been challehged. 2 "
Prison regulations have been upheld in the name of these interests which required
inmates to undergo body cavity searches, 299 prevented the receipt of packages,"° pre-
vented the prisoners from associating freely, 3" and prevented the prisoners from receiv-
ing uncensored and unsearched mail.302 In a proceeding against. a hunger striker, there-
fore, the state may also assert these interests as limitations on the rightg OF the inmate." 3
The first institutional interest — the preservation of internal order and discipline —
recognizes the need for prison officials to mantain control within prison walls. 3 "
Restrictions on an inmate's rights have been upheld in the name of internal order and
discipline in several instances: segregation of an inmate from the rest of the prison
population,3" creation of penalties and deterrents by prison athninstrators, 206 denial of
1" Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978).
269 See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977).
299 Id. at 129.
416 U.S. 396 (1974).
292 Id. at 412.
293 Id. at 398.
2 " Id. at 412-15.
295 Id. at 412.
296 Id.
297 Id.
299 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish ; 441 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979) (restrictions on pre-trial detainees
challenged on first and fourteenth amendment grounds); Jones, 433 U.S. at 133 (prohibition against
prisoners' union's Meetings challenged as first amendment violation); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
826 (1974) (restrictions on prison correspondence challenged on lirst amendment grounds).
299 Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-60.
'" Id. at 548-50.
3" Jones, 433 U.S. at 129- 33.
""' Pell, 417 U.S. at 823-28.
"3 See, e.g., Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 70 -71, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627. In Chapman, the court stated:
"Whereas a prisoner's right of expression may not be circumscribed to an extent greater than that
required for the legitimate ends of prison security and administration ... those legitimate interests
clearly include the need to prevent a prisoner's suicide." Id. (citations omitted).
3"4 Bell, 441 U.S. at 547.
305 United States ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 467 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1972); Evans v. Mosley, 455
F.2d 1084 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 977 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973);
United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 471 F.2d 1197, 1201 (3d Cir. 1972), on remand sub nom. Tyrrell
v. Taylor, 394 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Pa. 1975), modified, 505 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1976).
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religious meetings 3 07 and limited censorship of prisoners' mail."" Thus, this institutional
state concern will act as a potent limitation on prisoners' rights.
The second state interest identified in Procunier — prison security and the prevention
of unauthorized entry309 — frees prison officials to take appropriate action to prevent
escape from the correctional facility. 310 Applying this interest, prison regulations have
been approved which prevent the receipt of packages which might contain concealed
weapons, 3 " and allow prison officials to segregate potentially dangerous inmates.'" The
state's institutional concern in preventing escapes, therefore, will authorize prison officials
to restrict inmates' constitutional rights even more closely.
The final institutional interest identified by the Procunier Court was the rehabilitation
of prisoners 3 13 Prison officials have a legitimate interest in rehabilitation and may restrict
the freedoms of prisoners to further this interest. 314 Inmates can be required to work in a
prison incfustry 315 and to participate in educational prograrns 316 in the interest of rehabili-
tation. Thus, this third state concern may also act to curtail an individual's rights in the
prison context.
The prison context, therefore, causes an infusion of institutional state interests."'
These interests provide legitimate justifications for restrictions on a prisoner's constitu-
tional rights."' Taken together, the paternal and institutional interests of the state
present a formidable counterweight to the asserted rights of the inmate.
3. Judicial Standards in the Prison Context
In the balancing process, the prisoner must overcome a host of state interests. 319 In
addition to the numerous state interests, both paternal and institutional, which may
defeat the hunger striker, the current judicial climate is unsympathetic to the prisoner's
claims. 3 " The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that clue to the difficulties of
running a penal institution, prison officials are entitled to great judicial deference.'" For
example, in Saxbe v. Washington Pose" the Court was faced with a challenged prison
307 Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 24 15th Cir. 1969); Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d 966, 971-72
(8th Cir. 1969).
2" Procunier, 416 U.S. at 415; Taylor v. Sterrett. 532 F.2(1 462, 468 (5th Cir. 1976).
3" Procunier, 416 U.S. at 412.
310 Bell, 441 U.S. at 547.
311 Id. at 548-51.
3 " See United States ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 467 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1972).
313 Procunier, 416 U.S. at 412.
3 " Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1971).
312 Clayborne v. Long, 371 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Laaman v. Hancock, 351 F.
Supp. 1265, 1270 (D.N.H. 1972); Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Stipp. 1005, 1012 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 393
U.S. 266 (1968).
310
	 v. McLemore, 523 F.2d 838, 839 (8th Cir. 1975); Rutherford v. Hutto, 377 F. Supp.
268, 272 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
3 " See generally Bell, 441 U.S. at 520; Jones, 433 U.S. at 119.
3" See .supra notes 288-316 and accompanying text.
31 " See supra notes 243-318 and accompanying text.
' 2" Singer, Prisoners' Rights Litigation: A Look At the Past Decade, and a Look at the Coming Decade, 44
FEn. PROM., Dec. 1980, 1, 8.
321 Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977); Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974).
322
	 U.S. 843 (1974). Saxbe involved a challenge by newsmen and inmates of a federal prison
regulation prohibiting interviews between the media and individually designated inmates. Id. at 844.
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regulation which restricted media access to the inmates. 323 In upholding the restriction,
the Court expressly relied on the "expert and professional" judgment of the prison
adminstrator, who believed that interviews could lead to disciplinary problems. 324 Simi-
larly, the Court upheld the same type of regulation in Pell v. Procunier, 325 while also
relying on the judgment of prison officials. 326 Accordingly, prison officials are given
great latitude in the day-to-day administration of a correctional facility, 327 and this
deference impacts upon prisoners' assertions of constitutional rights.
The Court's policy of deference to the prison officials shifts the burden of proof to
the party against whom the officials are attempting to enforce their regulations. 328 The
Court has repeatedly held that in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, the
validity of prison administrators' judgments will be upheld. 329 In Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Union, 33 ° the Court allowed a ban on inmate solicitations for group meetings
because it was rationally related to the reasonable objectives of orderly prison administra-
tion.33 ' The rational relation standard was also applied in Bell v. Wolfish. 332 Bell involved a
challenge by inmates of several prison policies which were alleged to violate the prisoners'
privacy rights.333 Applying the rational relation standard, the Court upheld all of the
challenged policies. 334
These cases illustrate the effect of a prisoner's incarceration on the adjudication of
his constitutional rights. 335 Normally, state regulations impinging constitutional privacy
rights would mandate a strict judicial examination• 336 In the prison context, however, the
prisoner, due to his incarceration will be denied the heightened judicial protection he
would otherwise be afforded."' Instead, the appropriate judicial scrutiny for alleged
323
	 at 848.
324
	
at 849. There was no suggestion, however, that this particular prison administration
possessed any more "expertise" than any other prison administration. See id. at 848.
325
	 U.S. 817, 835 (1974).
326 Id. at 827.
3 " Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).
ate
	
433 U.S. at 128; Pell, 417 U.S. at 827.
229 Bell, 441 U.S. at 548; Jones, 433 U.S. at 128; Pell, 417 U.S. at 827.
3" 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
33 ' Id. at 129. In Jones, the prisoners claimed that several of their first amendment rights were
violated by prison officials, such as the prevention of the prisoners' union from meeting and
solicitation of inmates for the union, and mail restrictions. Id. at 122.
332 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538.
3.73 Id. at 525-27. In Bell, the prisoners challenged the Metropolitan Correctional Center's
policies of "double bunking" inmates in a single occupancy cell, prohibiting them from receiving
books and packages not directly from the supplier, and routine body cavity searches of prisoners. Id.
3" Id. at 550-59.
"6 See supra notes 288-334 and accompanying text.
336 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). In Carolene Products, the Court
explained that it reserves the application of strict judicial scrutiny for the examination of governmen-
tal policies which act to restrict the political process, or which are aimed at discrete and insular
minorities. Id. at 152 n.4. Footnote four in Carotene Products articulates the approach adopted by the
Supreme Court in its application of different levels of scrutiny. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 16-6 (1978). This doctrine has been extended to allow strict judicial examination of situations
where the fundamental constitutional rights of the individual are infringed. Id. at § 11-4. See also
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (strict scrutiny of statute prohibiting possession of
obscene materials within home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (strict scrutiny of
statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives).
327 See supra notes 223-40 and accompanying text.
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violations of a prisoner's fundamental rights shifts to the rational relation standard. 339
Under this standard, the prisoner will find it difficult to overcome the asserted interests of
the state. 339 This difficulty is illustrated by the Massachusetts case of Commissioner of
Corrections v. Meyers. 3" In Meyers, the prisoner asserted his privacy right to prevent state
officials from administering hemodialysis against his will. 3" The court stated that taken
together, the paternal interests of the state and Meyer's privacy right yield a "very close
balance" of interests. 342 The Meyers court concluded, however, that consideration of the
state's institutional interests, with its resultant shift in judicial scrutiny, decisively tipped
the balance in favor of the state. 343 As Meyers demonstrates, therefore, the fact. of a
prisoner's incarceration will significantly influence the weight accorded his constitutional
rights, often tipping the balance in favor of the state.
In sum, a prisoner who attempts to establish his right to hunger strike is faced with
formidable obstacles. 344 His rights will be limited and restricted by an array of paternal
and institutional state interests. 343 Moreover, he faces a judicial climate which favors the
prison administration. 349 To prevail, the prisoner must prove that his constitutional rights
overcome all of these obstacles. 347 Under current constitutional analysis, a court must
balance the rights of the individual against the interests of the state, 3 " The next section
will undertake this balancing process, 3 "
III. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK: THE BALANCING PROCESS
The proper judicial approach to a hunger strike case entails the balancing of the
prisoner's constitutional rights to privacy and free expression against the interests of the
state in the correctional facility context. To evaluate the requisite balancing, this section
will apply the constitutional framework to a hypothetical hunger-striking prisoner."' The
rights to privacy and of free expression will be analyzed according to the following
scheme. The relative weight. of the prisoner's constitutional rights will be briefly dis-
ttissed."' Next, each state interest will be separately applied and its relative merit
338 See supra notes 319-34 and accompanying text.
339
	 cases seem to be won or lost on the court's choice of the proper judicial scrutiny. Once
the rational relation standard is adopted, the outcome is usually against the party challenging the
state regulation. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1980), rell'g
denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1980); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 159 (1973);
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949); South Carolina State Highway Dept.
v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 196 (1938). Conversely, if strict judicial scrutiny is applied, the
government can rarely justify its statute or regulation. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506
(1977); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 383 (1971).
"° 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979).
"' Id. at 257, 399 N.E.2d at 453.
342 Id. at 263, 399 N.E.2d at 457.
"I Id. at 264, 399 N.E.2d at 457.
344 See supra notes 243-343 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 243-318 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 319-343 and accompanying text.
347 See, e.g., Meyers, '379 Mass. at 255, 399 N.E.2d at 452, in which the court held that the
prisoner's constitutional right to privacy was noi. strong enough to outweigh the combined interests of
the state.
34 " See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125-27 (1977).
"" See infra notes 350-479 and accompanying text.
358 See infra notes 355-479 and accompanying text.
351 See infra notes 355-62 and 451-56 and accompanying text.
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evaluated.352 Finally, the individual's rights and all the state interests will be considered in
toto to complete the balancing process. 353 After this balancing of constitutional rights
against state interests, a proposal for a new evaluation of the personal privacy right will be
discussed.354
A. Right to Privacy Versus the Interests of the State
The hunger strikers in Zant, Chapman, and Narick claimed that their right to privacy
entitled them to refuse force-feedings by the state officials.355 As previously indicated, the
right to privacy in the context of a hunger strike involves two components: the right to
bodily integrity and the right to self-determination. 3" The right to bodily integrity allows
the individual to prevent intrusions upon his person. 357 This right, therefore, may be
invoked by a prisoner who is threatened with force-feedings, either intravenously or by
means of a gastric nasal tube. In both types of treatment, the prisoner's person has been
violated without his consent. Such nonconsensual medical procedures are in contradiction
to the doctrine of informed consent and infringe the individual's right to bodily integ-
rity.358 Thus, the right to bodily integrity weighs heavily for the prisoner in the hunger
strike situation.
The right to self-determination also provides great support to the prisoner. A hunger
strike is a decision by the prisoner to pursue a specific course o f action. 3" From the nature
of hunger striking, it can be presumed that a prisoner will undertake such a course of
conduct only if he strongly believes in his purpose. 3" The fundamental right of the
individual to hold any belief he wishes and to pursue a course of conduct accordingly is at
the core of the right to self-determination. 3 " Many scholars have found this right so
essential that it has been considered the prerequisite for the enjoyment of all other
liberties. 362 When prison officials compel a hunger striker to eat, they act to curtail the
352 See infra notes 363-428 and accompanying text.
"' See infra notes 430-79 and accompanying text.
3" See infra notes 480-500 and accompanying text.
"5 Zant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624;
Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 58.
35° See supra notes 138-93 and accompanying text.
357 See Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 237.
3" See generally Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relation-
ship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533 (1970).
356 See, e.g., Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625, where the prisoner chose not to eat
because of his desire to draw attention to the plight of starving children throughout the world.
36° Given the profound effects of an individual's decision to hunger-strike, it is clear that the
prisoner strongly believes in his purpose. Presumably, if the individual wavers in his purpose, he will
begin to eat again. Thus, the "strength" of the belief is easily determined by the prisoner's adherence
to his strike. As to the nature of the belief, it is not for any court to evaluate subjectively the
"importance" of the prisoner's belief. In Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980), a
case involving a challenge to a stale fornication law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the
state's "police power should properly be exercised to protect each individual's right to be free from
interference in defining and pursuing his own morality, not to enforce a majority morality on
others." Id. Similarly, with respect to ideas protected by the first amendment, Justice Marshall stated
in his majority opinion in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1966): "The constitutional guarantee is not
confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority." Id. at 566. Thus,
the right to self-determination, as a constitutional guarantee, would be meaningless if the prisoner's
ability to express himself were subject to evaluation of the "worth" of his purpose.
38 ' See supra notes 163-93 and accompanying text.
a" See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, j.j., dissenting) ("the right
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actions of an individual which are premised on his fundamental beliefs. Force-feeding,
therefore, impinges the individual's right to self-determination.
The prisoner, after invoking his personal privacy right, will have to contend with the
asserted interests of the state. Each state interest, therefore, must be separately consid-
ered in the hunger strike context. 363
 Moreover, the relative importance of these state
interests"' must be considered and balanced against the privacy right of the indiyidual. 363
In this respect, the first. of the state's paternal interests — the preservation of life —
weighed heavily against the hunger strikers in Zant, Chapman, and Narick. 366
 Since a
hunger strike, if carried to the extreme, will end in death, this interest will act as a strong
limitation against a prisoner's right to strike under a traditional mode of analysis.367 As
such, it may be compelling enough to tip the balance against the prisoner in many
instances.
The state's interest in the preservation of life, however, is premised on the assump-
tion that citizens want to enjoy uninterrupted life. 368
 Where a competent individual
declines life-saving medical treatment, the normal congruity of interests between individ-
ual welfare and state protection is clisrupted. 363
 The presumption that the citizen de-
mands self-preservation is no longer operative. 370
 This argument applies with equal force
to the hunger striker. His decision not to eat is a denial of the wish to continue living. This
is not to say, of course, that every prisoner who initiates a hunger strike intends to die. 37 '
A great number of cases involve strikes by prisoners with no intent to die. 372 There is,
however, no better way to test the resolution of a prisoner than by letting him continue his
hunger strike uninterrupted. Any prisoner who has not made a serious and fundamental
personal decision will begin to eat again. Those hunger strikers who persist in refusing to
eat will demonstrate the conflict of interests between the individual and society described
above. 373
The state might also argue that. its interest in the preservation of life includes
promotion of respect for the general sanctity of human life."' Yet it is clear that our
society has some values which apparently outweigh its general concern for human life. 3 "
to be let alone" is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men); see
also Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 241.
363 See infra notes 368-426 and accompanying text.
364 Id.
365 See infra notes 427-79 and accompanying text.
"8 Zant, 248 Ca. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 68, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 626;
Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 58.
'" See, e.g., Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 58, in which the court expressly held that the state's interest in
preservation of life outweighed the prisoner's right.
368 Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 243.
369 Id.
370 Id.
"' Although there have been many reported instances of hunger-striking, see supra note 126,
the cases highlighted in this note represent the only instances where the prisoner refused to eat for a
substantial period of time.
372 See supra note 371.
3" See Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 243.
374 See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 728, 370 N.E.2d
at 417.
375 See Friedman, Interference with Human Life: Some Jurisprudential Reflections, 70 CoLum. L. REV.
1058, 1065-67 (1970). Professor Friedman argues that society, through the instrument of the state,
has shortened or otherwise terminated individuals' lives on the basis of "natural law" concepts. Id.
The reasons advanced for interference with human life include wars of self-defense, medical
experimentation, euthanasia, and the police power. ld. at 1067-75.
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Self-determination is such a value. 376 In Saikewicz, the court recognized that the right to
self-determination was what gave value to human life."' That court reasoned that the
value of life so perceived is lessened by the refusal to allow the individual the right of
choice. 3 " Thus, while on its face the state interest in the preservation of life appears to
weigh heavily against the hunger striker, upon closer examination the importance of the
state interest diminishes when measured against the privacy right of the competent
individual who is willing to die. When viewed in terms of these arguments, this first
paternal interest should not he accorded great significance in the context of a hunger-
striking individual."'
The second paternal interest of the state is the prevention of suicide."' The Chapman
court relied heavily on this state interest in rejecting Chapman's privacy claim. 381 That
court held that Chapman's attempt to assert constitutional protections for his hunger
strike was "ludicrous" in light of the state's legitimate and compelling interest in the
prevention of suicide."' The hunger striker, as one who is attempting to bring about his
own demise, must always overcome the state's assertion of this interest. As Chapman
illustrates, this task will often be difficult to accomplish. 383
The state's interest in the prevention of suicide, however, is actually an interest in
preventing irrational self-destruction. 384 The principal objective of the suicide statutes is
to secure assistance for the individual whose suicide attempts are the products of rash,
unbalanced, or confused judgments. 385 If the individual has made a deliberate choice to
die, the state's interest acts only as a temporary postponement, for a determined individ-
ual can likely find several alternatives. 386 A hunger strike requires unwavering determina-
tion over a period of weeks. 3" Thus, a decision by a prisoner to refuse food cannot be said
to be a product of rash action. Competency, therefore, is the key to weakening the impact
of this state interest. In Zant and Chapman each hunger striker was expressly adjudged to
be competent, thereby eliminating the concern that his decision not to eat was an unbal-
anced one. ss "
A hunger striker also might argue that his conduct did not fall within the statutory
definition of suicide. 389 The Saikewicz court defined suicide as consisting of both an intent
37°
	 Courts have often implicitly found the right to self-determination to outweigh society's
concern when they have allowed an individual or his guardian to choose a course of conduct which
would result in death. See In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 376 (D.C. 1972); In re Schiller, 148 N.J.
Super. 168, 174, 372 A.2d 360, 363 (1977); /o re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 975, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523,
524 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
377 Saikewicz, 373 Mass, at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
37H Id.
37" See supra notes 359-78 and accompanying text.
3"° Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
3" Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 68, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
3S2
3K3
3" Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11.
555 Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 256.
3" WILLIAMS, Tom, SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 293 (1956).
387 Note that all three hunger strikers discussed herein had resolutely held to their refusals to
eat for at least three weeks before the prison administrators initiated proceedings. Zant, 248 Ga. at
833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625; Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 55.
3" Zant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625; see
also Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 55.
3" Cf. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla.
1980). The Satz court was faced with a request to allow Perlmutter to be disconnected from a
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to die and an active setting of the death-producing agent in motion.'" Under this
definition, the inmate could assert that he did not intend to die, but only intended his
hunger strike as a protest aimed at producing a certain condition. Alternatively, the
prisoner could argue that his death would be caused through his nonfeasance, and not by
any act. he himself has committed."' Neither argument. is persuasive. Efforts to distin-
guish suicide on the basis of misfeasance versus nonfeasance or affirmative acts versus
passive refusals have not convinced many commentators. 39' Nor is an attempt to argue
lack of intent to die effective, because a hunger striker knows with a substantial certainty
that the result of his actions will be his own death."' Furthermore, even though an act
does not fall within the statutory definition of suicide, the state's policy in prevention of
suicide still may be relevant."'
Avoidance of characterizing the hunger strike as an attempt. to bring about self-
destruction, therefore, appears unlikely. As illustrated by the cases, the state does have a
legitimate and compelling interest in the prevention of suicide.595 This state interest will
weigh heavily against the prisoner in the balancing of rights and interests. Thus, the only
way an inmate can overcome this strong state interest is by asserting an even stronger
persona] constitutional guarantee. This reasoning is precisely the position adopted by
some commentators: an individual, by virtue of his personal privacy right, should be
permitted to die when his decision is clearly competent and deliberate, regardless of the
form of self-clestruction.396
The third paternal interest of the state is the protection of dependents. 397 The state
has a legitimate interest in preventing an individual from dying when it would be forced to
assume the burden of supporting that individual's dependents."' If dependents exist,
therefore, this state concern will weigh heavily against the prisoner.'" Thus, the weight
lifesaving device. 14. at 160-61. The court held that Perlmutter's wish to terminate treatment was not
a slat utory suicide attempt, since, if he were disconnected, his death would result from natural causes
and not his own acts. Id. at 162.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11.
3 E" See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). A similar argument
to the one made in Satz could be made for the hunger striker. The prisoner would claim that his
refusal to eat has the same legal significance as Perhnutter's request to be disconnected from the
respirator. See supra note 389. Death in both cases would result. from natural causes — starvation in
the hunger-strike case, and asphyxiation in Satz.
312 See, e.g., Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 255 n.133; Ford, Refusal of Blood Transfu-
sions by Jehovah's Witnesses, 10 CATH. LAW. 212, 225 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Ford, Refusal of
Transfusions]; Note, An Adult's Right to Resist Blood Transfusions: A View Through John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW 571, 574-75 (1972).
333 W. pROSSER, LAW OF 'FORTS 32 (4th ed. 1971), With respect to intent, Prosser states that
"where a reasonable man in the defendant's position would believe that a particular result. was
substantially certain to follow, he will be dealt with by the jury, or even by the court, as though he had
intended it." Id.
394 See State ex ref. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1975). In
that case, the court held that the attempt to commit suicide was probably not an indictable offense,
but would still be adverse to the state's compelling interest in preventing suicide. Id.
38s
	 supra notes 380-94 and accompanying text.
3" See Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142 at 258; Ford, Refusal of Transfusions, supra note 392,
at 225; Comment, Right to Refuse Treatment, _supra note 145, at 628..
3" Sa.ikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
393 See Comment, Right to Refuse Treatment, supra note 145, at 615-18.
'" See Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008
(RC. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Raleigh Fitkin - Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v.
Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
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given to this state concern will vary according to the inmate's particular situation. In Zant,
Chapman and Narick, none of the prisoners had dependents and the states were not able to
assert this interest."° It seems clear, however, from the related cases of the right to refuse
medical treatment that where the state can claim this interest, the balance will be tipped
decidedly against the prisoner."'
The degree of significance accorded the state interest in dependents' financial
maintenance, however, could be said to vary with the term of a priSoner's incarceration.
That is, a hunger striker who is serving an extended prison term might plausibly argue
that his incarceration has deprived his dependents, if he has any, of any financial support
he might have provided."° 2 While the inmate is incarcerated ; the state will have to support
his dependents anyway. If the inmate is serving a shorter term, the state will still be able to
claim this interest since the prisoner will he able to work again once he is released. In light
of the above arguments, t he effectiveness of the state's assertion of this interest will be
diminished in those hunger-strike cases where dependents actually exist.
The last paternal interest of the state is the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the
medical profession.4 " t The state may claim it has a legitimate interest in allowing doctors
to practice in accordance with accepted mores."' Those mores dictate that doctors
prolong the lives of patients in their care.'" A number of recent decisions, however, have
tended to dismiss the importance of this interest. ln In re Quinlan,'" the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled that the individual's strong personal privacy right was superior to
the state's interest in medical ethics."' Similarly, in In re Quackenbash, 4 " a New Jersey trial
court. rejected the state's assertion of this interest as clearly secondary to the individual's
constitutional rights.400 Moreover, in Natick, the court held that this state interest did not
apply to the facts of a hunger strike case."° Thus, even though it may be contrary to
"° See Zant, 248 Ga. at 832, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman., 87 A.D.2d at 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 623;
Narick, 292 S.E.2(1. at 54. The application ()I' this interest to the balancing process is notably absent in
all three hunger-strike cases. Id.
"' See 93 A.L.R.3d 67, supra note 262, at 82-83. Once this interest has been found, the courts
have been reluctant to hold in the patient's favor. Id.
402
 For example, a prisoner serving a twenty-year sentence will not be able to provide support to
his minor dependents. Admittedly, twenty years is an arbitrary line to draw. After twenty years,
however, any minor dependents will be adults and able to support. themselves after the prisoner is
released. The point remains that as long as the prisoner is incarcerated for an extended time he
cannot support anyone. Therefore. the state will be forced to assume the obligation.
4 " Saikewicz, 373 Mass. ar 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
4 °' See Comment, Right to Refuse  Treatment, supra note 145, at 619.
" 5 See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hasp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 578, 279 A.2d 670, 671 (1971),
in which the patient was an auto accident victim who refused to undergo necessary blood transfu-
sions. The New Jersey Supreme Court held, inter alia, that since the hospital was an involuntary host
and that its interests were contrary to the beliefs of the patient, it was not unreasonable to permit the
staff to act according to its professional ethics. Id. at 583, 279 A.2d at 673.
4 " 70 N.J. 10, '355 A.2(.1 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). in Quinlan, the father of a
twenty -one year old woman in a persistent vegetative state sought the express power to authorise the
discontinuance of treatment. Id at 15. 355 A.2cl at 651. The New jersey court concluded that the
father could exercise his daughter's right to self-determination, which included the right to discon-
tinue treatment. Id. at 51, 355 A.2d at 669.
4" Id. at 42-51, 355 A.2d at 664-69.
4" 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978). In Quackenbush, the court upheld a guardian's
decision to refuse the amputation of bis ward's legs, based on the privacy interests of the patient. Id.
at 290, 383 A.2d at 790.
4°u
	
at 290, 383 A.2cl at 789.
41 ° Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 57. The West Virginia court, however, did not indicate its reasoning for
not applying this interest to the facts of the case. See id.
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accepted medical practice to let a hunger-striking prisoner die, the stale will not be able to
use this interest effectively against the inmate. In light of the cases, this state interest is not
applicable in the context of a hunger-striking prisoner."' Thus, even if' the stale advances
this argument, the balancing process should remain unaffected.
While the four paternal interests of the state do not yield a decisive answer when
balanced against the rights of the individual,'" they constitute only part of the state's
array of interests. The state may also assert its institutional interests as identified in
Procunier.'" In a proceeding against a hunger-striking -
 prisoner, the state will advance its
institutional interests as justifications for its restrictions of the inmate's rights.'" The first
institutional interest — the preservation of internal order and discipline— has been held
to allow prison officials to restrict an inmate's constit tutorial rights.' 15 A hunger striker can
cause disorder and unrest in a cell block, which may be reason enough to allow prison
officials to force-feed him.' 16 In Chapman, the court noted that the prisoner's hunger
strike had caused disruption in the procedures in his unit, resentment among the other
inmates and resulted in other prisoners adopting the "starvation technique.'" Such
effects, if alleged and proved by the state, would weigh heavily against the hunger striker.
The second institutional interest of the state — prison security and prevention of
unauthorized entry 418
 — is of doubtful applicability considering the weakened state of
a prisoner who has not eaten for several days.' 19 A prisoner confined to a bed in the
infirmary, near coma and constantly monitored by the hospital staff, is not a high escape
risk.420
 Logically, however, prison administrators could argue that the added attention
given to the hunger striker detracts from the overall security for the entire prison.
Although this argument has never been advanced, it could conceivably militate against the
prisoner in light of the culTent judicial deference accorded to penal administrators. 421
The third institutional interest of' the state is the rehabilitation of prisoners.422
 Prison
administrators have a legitimate interest in rehabilitation and may restrict. freedoms of the
prisoner to further this interest Useful productive labor for all prisoners is seen as a
basic element in rehabilitation.' 2 ' Moreover, prison labor has been involuntarily imposed
upon inmates with the approval of most con rts. 425 There is no recognized right to decline
rehabilitation. 426
 It can be assumed that a prisoner who hunger strikes until he dies has
411 See supra notes 403-10 and accompanying text.
"2 See supra notes 355-41 1 and accompanying text.
"3 See infra notes 414-31 and accompanying text.
414 See, e.g., Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974).
416 Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
417 Id.
418 Procunier, 416 U.S. at 412.
419 See, e.g., Zant, 248 Ga. at 83, 286 S.E.2d at 716, where the prisoner was in ketosis, in a coma,
and in danger of dying.
42° In each case discussed herein, the prisoner had been transferred  to a medical center, had lost
excessive weight and was in danger of dying. Zara, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman, 87
A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625; Narich, 292 S.E.2d at 55.
421 See supra notes 319-43 and accompanying text.
422 Procunier, 416 U.S. at 412.
423 Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1971).
424 RUBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTIONS 326 (2d ed. 1973).
425 Note, A New Perspective in Prisoners' Rights: The Right to Refuse Treatment and Rehabilitation, 10
J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 173, 175 (1976). [hereinafter cited as Note, New Perspective].
426 Id. at 175-77.
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prevented the slate from rehabilitating him. Since the state's interest in rehabilitation
applies to all prisoners, the inmate cannot avoid the impact of this interest by virtue of his
hunger strike. The state's interest in rehabilitation, therefore, runs strongly against the
prisoner.
The institutional interests of the state appear to provide a strong argument in favor
of the prison administrators against. the inmate's right to hunger st rike. 4 " Moreover, the
state's position becomes practically insurmountable when viewed in tight of the current.
judicial climate,' The Supreme Court. has required that great deference he given to
prison officials. 41 " Furthermore, the Court has required that challenged penal restrictions
need only bear a rational relation to the reasonable objectives of orderly prison adminis-
tration. 4" The institutional interests of the state and the rationale behind them, applied
to the case of a hunger striker, suffice to pass a rational relation standard. 4 t"
The institutional interests of the state, therefore, provide an effective barrier to
judicial recognition of a right to hunger strike.432 On the other hand, states' paternal
interests do not yield a clear result either way. 433 The state's interests in the preservation
of life and the prevention of suicide will be given great weight ,434 while the interests in the
protection of dependents 435 and medical ethical integrity arc not entitled to much consid-
eration. 436 If the hunger strike was removed from the prison context, the balancing
process would he difficult.'" The outcome would depend on the court's evaluation of the
relative strength of the personal privacy right. 438 ht the prison context, however, the
balancing process yields a clear result. The injection of the state's strong interests in
maintaining order and institutional security and in rehabilitation decisively tip the balance
in favor of the state. 439 Furthermore, the application of the "rational relation" standard in
the prison context renders the prisoner's chances of prevailing in asserting his right
extremely unlikely. 4 "
A hunger striker might argue that his personal privacy right is so strong that it
427 See .5- UPra notes 413-26 and accompanying text.
42 ' See supra notes 319-43 and accompanying text.
429 Saxbr v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827
(1974).
" 3 ') _Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977).
"I See supra notes 4 13-29 and accompanying text.
432 See ,supra notes 4 13 - 31 and accompanying text.
' 33 See .supra notes 366-411 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 474-95 and accompanying text.
435 See supra notes 397-402 and accompanying text. The state's interest in the protection of
dependents will probably be of no weight in the balancing process since past experience has shown
that the hunger striker does not have any dependents. See Zara, 248 Ga. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 717;
Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.\'.S.2d at 625; Narick, 292 S.E.2c1 at 57. Furthermore, even if
dependents exist, this interest may not be entitled to much consideration if the prisoner is serving an
extended sentence. See supra note 402 and accompanying text. i f dependents do exist, and the prison
term is short, this interest becomes important and may even he dispositive. Id.
'" See .supra notes 403 - 11 and accompanying text.
437 See, e.g., Commissioner of Corrections v. Meyers, 379 Mass. 255,399 N.E.2d 452 (1979). The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that, taken together, the state's paternal interests
and the individual's personal privacy right "yield a very close balance of interests." Id. at 263, 399
N.E.2d at 457. With such a close balance, subjective evaluations of the relative merit of each interest
could easily tip the balance in either direction.
'3a See id.
4 " See id. at 266, 399 N.E.2d at 458.
440 See supra notes 319- 43 and accompanying text.
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overcomes the combined paternal and institutional interests of the state. Indeed, this is
precisely the position that I lie Zan' court adopted."' Zant held that the individual's right
to personal privacy was superior to the compelling interests of the state. 442 Yet, both the
Chapman and Narick courts, when faced with identical cases, reached the opposite re-
sult.443 These results may indicate the influence of subjective judgments and valuations by
the courts that are beyond articulation. The Zant court used the same balancing process
described above.'" The difference in result can probably be attributed to the injection of
the court's own subjective evaluation of the relative weight of each factor, none of which
were articulated in the opinion. 445 For future cases, it would seem that subjective
evaluations of the strength of each factor might. affect the balancing process and lead to
inconsistent results,
The problem of subjectivity is answered by the Supreme Court's approach to prison-
ers' rights. The Court has adopted a rational relation framework,'" the purpose of which
is to allow courts to avoid making difficult subjective value judgments which may be
made more appropriately by another branch of government: 1 " The Court has adopted
an approach which gives penal officials the authority to run the prison system with
minimal oversight by the courts.'" Thus, if prison officials contest the hunger strike with
the rational arguments described above, the courts should resolve the case in the state's
favor. Under present law, however, the prison administrators may compel a hunger
striker to take nourishment, regardless of his claimed privacy rights.
B. Right to Free. Expression Versus the Interests of the State
The prisoner cannot claim the "absolute" protections of the first amendment."'"
Since a hunger strike involves conduct as well as speech, the state has much greater
latitude in regulating this type of expression than in regulating actual speech. 459 The state
may assert any of its legitimate interests to justify restrictions of free expression. 4 "
Furthermore, the hunger striker's imprisonment subjects his free expression right to
"' Zant, 248 Ga. ai 834, 286 S.E.2d at 717.
442 Id.
44a Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 71, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627; Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 58.
"4 See generally Zant, 248 Ga. at 833-34, 286 S.E.2d at 715-16.
"" See id.
4" See supra notes 319-43 and accompanying text.
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	 New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
732 (1963); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949). In these cases, the
Supreme Court recognized its limitations as a governmental institution. See Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 732.
Certain judgments require either intensive empirical investigation or the use of subjective value
judgments. In the former case, the legislature is better suited to make the investigation through
committees or hearings. See Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303-09. In the latter case, the subjective value
judgments often involve decisions which represent a policy choice rather than an issue of law. See
Railway Express, 336 U.S. at 109. In these circumstances, the Court defers to the legislature as the
decision-making body since they are elected by the people and can be said to represent the wishes of
the majority. See Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 932.
"9 See supra notes 319-99 and accompanying text. The combination of judicial deference
toward prison administrators and the low judicial review standard for justifying those policies
provides for minimal judicial oversight. Id.
449 See supra notes 199.222 and accompanying text.
"° See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 117
(1972).
451 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
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additional restrictions.'" Thus, the free expression right claimed by the prisoner is riot
strong. Any action by prison officials to prevent a prisoner from conducting a hunger
strike would involve, at most, an incidental restriction of free speech." 3 A hunger strike is
only a medium by which the prisoner carries out his protest."' The prison officials, for
the purpose of rendering necessary medical treatment, will act to curtail the medium of
protest, but not the idea directly." 3 The prison policy of rendering necessary medical
treatment has only the incidental effect of restricting the inmate's right to free expression
by forcing him to take nourishment.
The standard for testing the validity of an incidental restriction on free expression
was enunciated in United Stales v. O'Brien."' In O'Brien, a college student burned his
draft card in protest of the war in Vietnam."'" O' Brien was convicted olviolating a federal
statute which proscribed the intentional destruction of selective service registration
cards.a 5 " O'Brien appealed the conviction, claiming the statute abridged his first amend-
ment freedoms. 459 The O'Brien Court therefore - developed a standard to test the validity
of the federal statute, which had the incidental effect of restricting O'Brien's speech
activities.465 The standard has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Court as the correct test
for determining the validity of regulations that incidentally restrict first amendment
freedoms.'"
Under the standard announced in O'Brien, a governmental policy or regulation which
acts to restrict speech incidentally is justified if four conditions are met.'" First, the policy
or regulation must be within the constitutional power of the government.'" Second, the
policy or regulation must further an important governmental interest."' Third, the
governmental interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free speech.'" Last, the
' 2 See supra notes 288-303 and accompanying text. Notably, all the institutional interests of the
state are also present. Id.
" 3 Cf. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77 (goveinmental regulation prohibiting intentional destruction
of draft cards upheld even though incidentally restricting O'Brien's protest against Vietnam war).
But see Procunier v. Martinet, 416 U.S. 396, 413-15 (1974) (censorship of inmates' outgoing corre-
spondence disallowed as impermissible incidental restriction on first amendment rights of prisoners'
correspondents).
See Zara, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625:
Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 55. The prisoners were all hunger-striking to attract attention to the ideas in
which they believed. Id. Prevatte was attempting to draw the attention of prison officials to his claim
that his life was in danger. ',ant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716. Chapman's strike was intended to
draw world attention to the plight of starving children. Chapman, 37 A.D.2d at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at
625. White's hunger strike was in protest of prison conditions at the West Virginia State Penitentiary.
Narick, 292 S.E.2d at . 55.
'1 " See, e.g., Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 58. In Narick, the prison officials were seeking to save the
inmate's life. Id. They had no intention of suppressing White's speech; in fact, the court noted that
several alternative modes of communication were available to the prisoner. id.
"6 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
"T See id. at 369.
4;" Id. at 369 - 70.
4" Id. at 370.
46" Id. at 377.
4" See NAACP v, Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982) re/I'g denied, 103 S. Ct. 199
(1983); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 n.8 (1973); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 116
(1972); cf: Buckley v, Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (O'Brien test used to determine whether campaign
contribution statute violative of first amendment).
462 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
4 " Id,
464 Id.
463 Id.
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incidental restriction on the alleged first amendment. freedoms must be no greater than is
essential for the furtherance of that interest." In O'Brien, the Court fOuncl that all four
conditions were met, and the statute was upheld.'"
Although the issue of the prevention of a hunger strike as an incidental restriction of
free expression has not been carefully examined by any court,'" such a restriction
probably would be upheld. An examination of the validity of a prison policy which
Prevented hunger strikes must begin with the realization that the inmate's free expression
rights are subject to limits and restrictions.'" Thus, the O'Brien test would be applied in a
context where the individual's rights are diminished and subject to the additional institu-
tional interests of the state."° Applying the O'Brien test, first, the power to create prison
regulations lies within the scope of authority granted to prison officials.'" Second, the
orderly administration of the prisons has been held to be an important. governmental
interest.' 72
 Coupled with this institutional interest, the slate may assert its compelling
paternal interests.'" Moreover, with the prevailing judicial willingness to defer to the
judgment of prison officials,'" it appears certain that an important governmental inter-
est will be found. Third, the governmental interest in the prevention of hunger strikes is
unrelated to the suppression of speech.'" The government seeks to keep the prisoner
alive, not to stifle his free expression. 476 Finally, the restriction against hunger-striking
logically appears to be narrowly tailored to accomplish only that goal."" To do anything
less than force-feed him would be to let him die. Under the O'Brien standard, therefore,
the government meets all four prongs of the test. The government would he justified in
incidentally restricting a hunger striker's right to free expression to fulfill its important
interests.
In summary, under present law, the right to free expression cannot be utilized to
prevent prison officials from force-feeding a hunger-striking prisoner."" Since the right.
to privacy as presently expounded does not authorize the hunger striker to refuse
force-feedings either, 479
 it becomes clear that a state may compel a hunger striker to eat.
C. Proposal for Change: Comparison With the Emerging Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
Under present law, a state may compel a hunger-striking prisoner to eat.'" This
amounts to no less than a judicial sanctioning of state interference in the fundamental
4Gd
4" Id. at 382.
4" Of all t he hunger strike cases, the Chapman decision was the only one in which a court looked
into the prisoner's first. amendment claims. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at 70, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
Unfortunately for Chapman, the court only examined this issue long enough to find that his free
expression rights are so limited by his incarceration that his claim was insubstantial. Id.
4" See 54111 notes 194.222 and accompanying text.
.1 " See supra notes 288 - 318 and accompanying text.
17 ' See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128-33 (1977).
472 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974).
'73 See .supra notes 249-87 and accompanying text.
4 " See supra notes 319-43 and accompanying text.
473 The state's purpose is not to prevent the prisoner's message front being disseminated. its
purpose is to keep the hunger striker alive. The nVarick cows noted that its the prison context several
alternative means of communication were open to the prisoner. Narick, 292 S.E.2d at 58.
446 See id
'77 See id.
'7' See supra notes 451.77 and accompanying text.
479 See supra notes 355
-
448 and accompanying text.
-1 " See supra notes 350.479 and accompanying text.
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decision-making process of the individual."' The decision-making process is the essence
of personal liberty and the prerequisite for effective enjoyment of all other liberties. 482
Even though it reached the wrong result under the present. law, the Georgia Supreme
Court in Zant recognized the importance of self-determination. 483 The court stated that
although the state could incarcerate and even execute an individual in certain circum-
stances, it has no right to destroy a person's freedom of self-determination by frustrating
his attempt. to communicate a belief so strong that he is willing to die for it."' Thus, the
Georgia court placed the realm of an individual's choice to die for a belief beyond state
intrusion.485 As an act of self-determination, a prisoner's competent decision to hunger-
strike must be recognized as a protected element of fundamental personal liberty. The
recognition of a core area of personal liberty beyond the reach of the state mandates
judicial acceptance of a hunger striker's right to die.
An emerging judicial recognition of the right to die by refusing life-saving medical
treatment portends a new, expansive definition of the right to self-determination. Until
recently, the right to self-determination did not entitle individuals to refuse necessary
medical procedures.'" In the last few years, however, patients have been allowed to
refuse necessary blood transfusions, 487 remove life-sustaining respiratory devices, 48 " re-
fuse to undergo treatment for leukemia, 489 refuse to undergo necessary and life-saving
surgery49° and to discontinue potentially life-saving treatment for cancer."' In those
cases, the individual was permitted to choose a course of action which proximately
resulted in death. 492 The right to refuse medical treatment is premised on the rights of
self-determination and bodily integrity, 493 which are the same rights claimed by the
hunger striker. This line of cases, therefore, holds that under certain circumstances, the
right to personal privacy outweighs the interests of the state and allows the individual a
right to die."' So far, a majority of the courts have limited the certain circumstances in
which a right to die exists to those situations where the patient's prognosis for survival is
dim.495 A significant minority of courts, however, rejects this dim prognosis requirement
completely.ely :1 "
4 " See Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 241.
4 " Zant, 248 Ga. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 717.
433 Id. The Court stated, "We hold that Prevatte, by virtue of his right of privacy, can refuse to
allow intrusions on his person, even though calculated to preserve his life," Id.
484 id.
485 Id.
4"6 See generally 93 A.L.R..3d 67, supra note 249.
4 " In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 376 (D. D.C. 1972).
"" Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla.
1980).
48" Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745, 370 N.E.2d
417, 428 (1977) (decision made by a guardian ad litem).
48n
 In re Quakenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 290, 383 A.2d 785, 790 (1978); In re Vetter, 62 Pa.
D. & C.2d 619, 622 (Dist. Ct. 1973).
'" Suenram v. Soc'y of Valley Hosp., 155 N.J. 593, 601, 383 A.2d 143, 148 (1977).
492 See, e.g., Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. at 282, 383 A.2d. at 785, where the patient died shortly
after he refused to undergo the amputation of boat legs.
4 " See Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 142, at 241.
4 "4 See supra notes 486-93 and accompanying text.
4 " See, e.g., Satz v. Perlminter, 362 So.2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass.
App. C.c. 377, 380-81, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1'2'34 (1978) (by implication).
4 " Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. at 290, 383 A.2d at 789; see al3o Erikson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d
27, 28, 252 N.V.S.2d 705, 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
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The right to die need not be premised on whether a dint prognosis exists."' In cases
where the patient's refusal to consent to treatment on the basis of religious beliefs have
been upheld, no dim prognosis existed. Nonetheless, several courts have recognized the
right to die in this comext." 8 There is no relevant distinction today for a personal decision
based on religious beliefs versus one based on strongly-held fundamental personal beliefs
of any other kind . 4" The patient's refusal to allow treat ment and the hunger striker's.
refusal to eat are both the end result of the individual's personal calculus. Admittedly, the
hunger striker faces additional state interests that a right-to-die patient does not have to
overcorne. 5" The personal privacy right, however, is so essential to personal liberty, that
even these additional state interests should not justify the prevention of a hunger strike.
An individual's right to personal privacy must be extended to include the right to
hunger strike. The state must. not be allowed to intrude on this most fundamental human
liberty. Human dignity is promoted not by keeping an individual alive against his will, but
by giving him the liberty to determine his own destiny.
CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that at least three state courts have been squarely faced with suits by a
hunger-striking prisoner, 501 no court has yet undertaken a thorough analysis of the
constitutional issues presented by such a case. The framework for deciding a hunger-
strike case is a balancing process of the individual's personal privacy and free expression
rights against the paternal and institutional interests of the state. The relevant privacy
rights, the rights of self-determination and bodily integrity, are fundamental liberties
which protect an individual's exercise of his personal choice. The state's interests, how-
ever, in preserving human life and maintaining order in its prisons strongly mitigates
against the prisoner's privacy rights. Under the present law, the state's interest in force-
feeding a hunger striker outweigh the prisoner's constitutional rights when clue deference
is given to prison officials in the administration of prisons.
A prisoner, however, should be given the freedom to act on his fundamental beliefs,
when, as in the case of a hunger striker, no other prisoners are harmed. The state's
curtailment of a prisoner's hunger strike involves an impermissible intrusion into the
individual's personal decision-making calculus. The quality of life is not raised by restrict-
ing an individual's fundamental decisions, but by allowing each individual to choose his
own lifestyle.
STEVEN C. SUNSHINE
4 " See, e.g., Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 136 (N.D. Ill, 1972), where the
decedent refused blood transfusions on religious grounds. The court upheld the patient's refusal
even though there was every hope for a full recovery if he had accepted the transfusions. Id.
Martin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 147 Cal. App. 2d 137, 141-42, 304 P.2d 828, 830
(1956); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 376 (D.C. 1972); In re Brooks 32 M. 2d 361, 373, 205 N.E.2d
435, 442 (1965); In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 975, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (1976).
4 " See Cantor, Bodily Integrity, supra note 192, at 263.
39" For a discussion of these institutional interests of the state, see supra notes 288-318 and
accompanying text.
"I See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
